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ABSTRACT—In 2009, the world watched as Iranians took the online 
services that many have come to regard as tools of procrastination—
services like Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube—and transformed them into 
tools of cyber-democratization. When the Iranian government banned 
foreign journalists, citizens disseminated cell phone footage of peaceful 
protests and the government’s brutal response, keeping the world informed. 
But news did not escape Iran’s borders unaided. Liberation technology, 
particularly the popular anonymity network “Tor,” helped Iranian protesters 
bypass government censorship while remaining undetected. Today, the 
U.S.-based volunteers who comprise a significant segment of Tor’s operator 
network face an uncertain legal landscape because Tor can facilitate 
copyright infringement. I foresee that Tor operators will soon find 
themselves defendants in copyright infringement actions arising from file-
sharing activity, likely in connection with the BitTorrent protocol. The 
typical plaintiff’s strategy of subpoenaing Internet service providers to 
identify users based on Internet Protocol address can mistakenly identify 
Tor operators who, because of the nature of this technology, will appear to 
be the sources of any infringing activity passing through their virtual 
tunnels. Using the Iranian uprising as case study, I argue that Tor operators 
should be shielded from secondary infringement liability so that they can 
continue to facilitate speech in censored nations, thereby improving U.S. 
access to world news and nurturing democratic habits abroad. Specifically, 
volunteer anonymity network operators should enjoy protection under the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) § 512(a), a provision allowing 
safe harbor for transitory digital network communication providers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the summer of 2009, the world watched as Iranians took the online 
services that some of us have come to regard as tools of procrastination—
services like Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube—and turned them into tools 
of cyber-democratization. The grassroots effort that came to be known as 
Iran’s “Green Movement”1 materialized from a flurry of tweets, status 
updates, and online videos. And when the Iranian government banned 
foreign journalists, ordinary citizens disseminated grainy cell phone footage 
of peaceful street protests and the government’s brutal response, filling the 
void and keeping the world informed.2 Iconic images like the blank and 
bloodied face of Neda Agha-Soltan captivated U.S. audiences and turned 
 
1  The Green Movement has its roots in Iranian presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi’s “green 
wave” campaign. See Hooman Majd, Think Again: Iran’s Green Movement, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 6, 
2010), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/06/think_again_irans_green_movement. When 
Mousavi lost the bid in what most observers considered a rigged election favoring incumbent Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad, the campaign transformed into an election protest. Id. Today, the Green Movement is 
increasingly viewed as an Iranian civil rights movement. See, e.g., Hamid Dabashi, Iran’s Younger, 
Smarter Revolution, DAILY BEAST (Jan. 2, 2010, 1:37 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-
stories/2010-01-02/irans-younger-smarter-revolution/full (“For the last six months and since Day One of 
this uprising . . . I have consistently called and continue to call it a civil-rights movement.”); Majd, supra 
(“With every instance of recent government tyranny, from show trials of opposition politicians and 
journalists to the beatings and murders of some demonstrators on Iran’s streets, the movement has 
grown more steadfast in its demands for the rights of the people.”). 
2  See, e.g., Jessica Reed, Updated: Citizen Journalism Round-up, GUARDIAN (June 15, 2009, 10:00 
AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jun/15/iran-election-protests-blogs. 
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legions of casual observers into activists.3 
Separated by oceans, continents, and a language barrier, these newly 
minted activists seized on technology to bridge the gap. Liberation 
technology4—specifically, tools allowing censorship bypass5 and user 
anonymity—delivered a sort of twenty-first-century Underground Railroad. 
One tool in particular, an anonymity network called Tor,6 quickly emerged 
as a powerful ally to Persian Samizdat, helping Iranian protesters bypass 
government censors while remaining safely anonymous.7 Tor allowed Iran’s 
cyber-dissidents to voice their unmistakable demands for freedom and to 
share with the outside world their firsthand accounts of the government’s 
brutal response—all without revealing their online identities. 
Today, the U.S.-based volunteers that comprise a significant segment 
of Tor’s operator network8 face an uncertain legal landscape9 because Tor is 
 
3  See Monica Hesse, Facebook’s Easy Virtue, WASH. POST, July 2, 2009, at C1 (noting that social 
media activism surged following Neda’s death but suggesting that many of these activists may lack the 
commitment necessary to effect tangible change); Jessica Ravitz, Neda: Latest Iconic Image to Inspire, 
CNN WORLD (June 24, 2009), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-06-24/world/neda.iconic.images_1_neda-
agha-soltan-tiananmen-square-iran. 
4  Larry Diamond defines “liberation technology” as “any form of information and communication 
technology . . . that can expand political social, and economic freedom.” Larry Diamond, Liberation 
Technology, J. DEMOCRACY, July 2010, at 69, 70. He includes in this definition things like computers, 
the Internet, and social networking websites. Id. To his list, I add censorship-bypass tools and 
anonymizers. 
5  As used in this Comment, the term “bypass” indicates software and online services that enable 
Internet users to circumvent online censorship. Although “circumvention” is the term more often 
employed in information-technology circles, I avoid it in an effort to minimize confusion with 
“circumvention” as a legal term of art in the copyright context. See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 103, 112 Stat. 2860, 2863 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006)) 
(creating liability for “[c]ircumvention of copyright protection systems”). 
6  Tor describes itself as “free software and an open network that helps you defend against a form of 
network surveillance that threatens personal freedom and privacy, confidential business activities and 
relationships, and state security known as traffic analysis.” Anonymity Online, TOR PROJECT, 
https://www.torproject.org (last visited July 2, 2012). 
7  Although this Comment focuses on the role of anonymity networks in enabling Iran’s protesters-
turned-journalists to disseminate information to a world audience without fear of government reprisal, a 
separate benefit of anonymity lies beyond its scope: the role of anonymity in helping foreign activists 
organize and disseminate information among themselves. This latter benefit was never realized in Iran, 
where the news-disseminating power of social networking instead backfired against activists and 
exposed them to the Iranian regime. See Evgeny Morozov, Iran: Downside to the “Twitter Revolution,” 
DISSENT, Fall 2009, at 10, 12 (“[B]oth Twitter and Facebook give Iran’s secret services superb platforms 
for gathering open source intelligence about the future revolutionaries, revealing how they are connected 
to each other. . . . Once regimes used torture to get this kind of data; now it’s freely available on 
Facebook.”). 
8  Most Tor operators are located in the United States and Germany. Damon McCoy et al., Shining 
Light in Dark Places: Understanding the Tor Network, in PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES 63, 64 
(Nikita Borisov & Ian Goldberg eds., 2008). Tor’s architecture is such that its volunteer-run network 
could remain operational even after a complete shutdown of The Tor Project, Inc., the entity that 
presently funds and develops Tor software. This Comment’s inquiry is therefore cabined to the potential 
liability of Tor’s volunteer operators rather than that of The Tor Project. 
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amenable to both legal and illegal usage. As countersurveillance expert 
Richard Abbott has observed, “[m]any dismiss [Tor] as a den of thieves and 
pedophiles” while “[o]thers describe it as a beacon of democracy able to 
free the individual from oppression.”10 This Comment ponders the “den of 
thieves” allegation and considers one particular form of theft, copyright 
infringement. I argue that Tor operators—individuals who donate computer 
resource and bandwidth to make the Tor network possible—should not be 
held secondarily liable for the infringing activities of Tor users—
individuals who send Internet traffic through the Tor network in an effort to 
mask their online identities and bypass government censorship of the 
Internet.11 
Because the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)12 was not 
drafted with Tor in mind and because no anonymity network operator has 
yet faced secondary liability in a copyright infringement action, it is unclear 
whether Tor’s volunteer operators will be exempt from liability under 
DMCA § 512(a), a provision giving safe harbor to transitory digital 
network communication providers.13 And even though a global network like 
Tor could theoretically continue to function without any U.S.-based 
operators, the specter of infringement liability for these Tor operators is 
troubling because, at a minimum, it discourages the largest population of 
uncensored Internet users from volunteering as anonymity network 
operators.14 
 
9  Christopher Riley, The Need for Software Innovation Policy, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 
589, 607 (2007) (“The legal status of Tor is far from clear.”). 
10  Richard Abbott, An Onion a Day Keeps the NSA Away, J. INTERNET L., May 2010, at 22, 22. 
11  Tor is a volunteer-run network of computers that form a series of virtual tunnels through which 
Internet users can send and receive data anonymously. Tor: Overview, TOR PROJECT, 
http://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en (last visited July 2, 2012). This Comment uses the 
term “operator” to refer to an individual who installs Tor software on her computer for the benefit of 
others. The individual becomes one “stop” along the virtual Tor tunnel, encrypting data transmissions 
and handing them off to the next operator for further encryption—a process that anonymizes data and 
allows it to bypass any government-imposed censoring of the Internet. See id. (using the technical term 
“relay” instead of “operator”). By contrast, a “user” is an individual who installs Tor software for 
personal benefit: an Iranian blogger who seeks anonymity from prying government eyes; a Chinese 
college student who wants to get around the “Great Firewall of China”—a government censorship 
scheme that blocks access to websites like Facebook and Google; an American who is worried about 
identity theft. See What Is a Tor Relay? ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., http://www.eff.org/torchallenge/what-
is-tor (last visited July 2, 2012); Inception, TOR PROJECT, http://www.torproject.org/about/torusers.html.
en (last visited July 2, 2011). The distinction between Tor operators and users is explored in further 
detail infra Part I.C. 
12  Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in 
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (2006)). 
13  For further discussion of DMCA § 512(a), see infra Part III. 
14  The CIA reports that, as of 2008, the United States was second only to China in the number of 
Internet users. The World Factbook—Country Comparison :: Internet Users, CIA, https://
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2153rank.html (last visited July 2, 
2012). 
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Recent litigation suggests that, in the near future, Tor operators may 
find themselves defendants in copyright infringement suits arising from 
illegal file-sharing activity. The year 2010 saw the opening salvos of 
massive copyright litigation involving the popular file-sharing protocol 
BitTorrent.15 In a move reminiscent of the recording industry’s unpopular 
onslaught against individual file sharers in the early 2000s, independent 
filmmakers began pursuing tens of thousands of BitTorrent users who 
allegedly shared copies of films like The Hurt Locker.16 The filmmakers’ 
strategy involved subpoenaing Internet service providers (ISPs) to identify 
users based on Internet Protocol (IP) addresses.17 Although ISP delay tactics 
ultimately forced the filmmakers to voluntarily dismiss 90% of their 
defendants, more than 2300 unnamed defendants remain in the suit,18 and 
the Hurt Locker litigation is but one of many mass copyright infringement 
actions against alleged BitTorrent users.19 It seems inevitable that, 
 
15  BitTorrent is an Internet communication protocol that allows individuals to share large files 
quickly and easily. What Is BitTorrent and Why Are Its Users Being Sued?, THE TELEGRAPH (May 24, 
2011, 2:21 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/8533353/What-is-BitTorrent-and-why-are-its-
users-being-sued.html. Several BitTorrent-based file-sharing programs exist, including the popular 
“μTorrent” and “Vuze” (formerly called “Azureus”). See Results for “File Sharing,” CNET.COM, http://
download.cnet.com/1770-2196_4-0.html?query=file+sharing&searchtype=downloads (last visited July 
2, 2012). Two features distinguish BitTorrent from other file-sharing protocols: (1) BitTorrent breaks 
large files (like movies) into “chunks” for faster downloading and (2) it connects users directly to each 
other (rather than to a centralized server). See What Is BitTorrent and Why Are Its Users Being Sued?, 
supra. The absence of a centralized server is of legal import as copyright holders seeking legal redress 
for alleged infringement must bring separate suits against each individual file sharer—there is no 
Napster- or LimeWire-esque corporate middleman to sue. See id. 
16  See Voltage Pictures, LLC v. Does 1–5,000, 818 F. Supp. 2d 28, 45 (D.D.C. 2011) (denying a 
motion brought by putative defendants seeking to quash plaintiff’s subpoenas issued to their ISPs, 
denying putative defendants’ request for a protective order, and denying their motion to dismiss for 
improper joinder or want of personal jurisdiction); Eriq Gardner, “Hurt Locker” Lawsuit Target [sic] 
Pirates, REUTERS (May 11, 2010, 9:40 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/05/12/us-hurtlocker-
idUSTRE64B0AU20100512 (explaining that the plaintiff in these lawsuits, U.S. Copyright Group, had 
previously filed approximately ten other suits alleging piracy of other films). 
17  See Voltage Pictures, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 30–31. An “IP address” is a unique number, assigned by 
an ISP, identifying an Internet-connected computer. Although IP addresses alone do not contain 
personally identifiable information, ISPs are able to link them to customer accounts to provide claimants 
with the necessary identification. See Fact Sheet 18: Online Privacy: Using the Internet Safely, PRIVACY 
RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs18-cyb.htm (last updated July 2, 2012). IP 
addresses can, however, convey meaningful information about a user’s geographic location—a 
phenomenon called “geolocation.” See, e.g., Kevin F. King, Personal Jurisdiction, Internet Commerce, 
and Privacy: The Pervasive Legal Consequences of Modern Geolocation Technologies, 21 ALBANY L.J. 
SCI. & TECH. 61, 67–68 (2011) (describing how IP address data can reveal a user’s location within a 
thirty-mile radius). 
18  See enigmax, Record-Breaking BitTorrent Lawsuit Decimated, TORRENTFREAK (Sept. 30, 2011), 
http://www.torrentfreak.com/90-of-defendants-dismissed-from-record-breaking-bittorrent-lawsuit-
110930. 
19  See, e.g., Patrick Collins, Inc. v. John Does 1–23, No. 11–cv–15231, 2012 WL 1019034, at *1 
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 26, 2012) (“This case is one among many cases filed nationwide by copyright owners 
alleging that John Doe defendants downloaded their films without authorization using a peer-to-peer 
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eventually, some of the IP addresses subpoenaed in these BitTorrent 
lawsuits will identify innocent Tor operators who, because of the nature of 
this anonymity technology, will erroneously appear to be the sources of any 
infringing activity that passes through their virtual tunnels. 
This Comment focuses on the threat of infringement litigation faced by 
Tor operators. Nevertheless, conclusions reached here should also extend to 
operators of other decentralized, volunteer-run online networks that 
primarily function as tools for bypassing censorship and anonymizing 
online activity. Tor is not unique, but it is the “most public and widespread 
anonymity network.”20 Indeed, a recent Harvard study analyzing bypass-
tool usage in Iran, China, and other countries with substantial government 
censorship of the Internet found Tor to be one of the most popular tools as 
measured by unique monthly users.21 And because Tor technology has 
broad implications across such diverse areas as law enforcement, online 
privacy, and net neutrality,22 the legal status of its operator network is all the 
more worthy of examination.23 
Using the Iranian uprising of 2009 as a case study, this Comment 
argues that Tor operators should be shielded from secondary infringement 
liability so that they can continue to facilitate speech in heavily censored 
nations. In doing so, Tor operators can improve U.S. access to world news 
and nurture the development of democratic habits abroad. Part I describes 
how Iranian citizen journalists and the global online community worked in 
tandem to smuggle news out of Iran amid a mainstream media blackout and 
despite the Iranian regime’s best iron-fisted efforts to stifle what it viewed 
as dissent. These events did not go unnoticed in the United States, and Part 
 
(‘P2P’) file sharing network known as BitTorrent.” (footnote omitted)); see also houstonlawy3r, What to 
Do About These Smaller Doe Bittorrent Cases?, FED. COMPUTER CRIMES (Aug. 26, 2011), https://
torrentlawyer.wordpress.com/2011/08/26/small-doe-bittorrent-cases-in-home-state (“The bittorrent 
cases are speeding up, both in number of cases filed, and in the issues relating to the cases.”). 
20  Abbott, supra note 10, at 26. 
21  See HAL ROBERTS ET AL., HARV. U. BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y, 2010 
CIRCUMVENTION TOOL USAGE REPORT 9 (2010), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.
law.harvard.edu/files/2010_Circumvention_Tool_Usage_Report.pdf. 
22  “Net neutrality” (short for “network neutrality”) is a network design principle rooted in the 
assumption that public information networks are maximally useful when they are content-agnostic. See 
Network Neutrality FAQ, TIMWU.ORG, http://www.timwu.org/network_neutrality.html (last visited July 
2, 2012). In other words, the social and economic utility of a network (like the Internet) increases as 
network accessibility increases, allowing all types of digital interactions to flow freely. Id. Professor 
Tim Wu draws a helpful analogy to electrical grids: the grid is an implicitly neutral network because it 
“does not care if you plug in a toaster, an iron, or a computer”; this neutrality has allowed the grid to 
“survive[] and support[] giant waves of innovation in the appliance market.” Id. Proponents of Internet 
neutrality argue for similar open-access regulations while critics maintain that open access will “slow 
the pace of broadband deployment.” Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141, 141 (2003). 
23  Abbott, supra note 10, at 22 (“[A]n understanding of Tor will affect every Internet discussion you 
will ever have. Learn to use Tor effectively and you will find yourself . . . chuckling as the naïve and 
uninitiated debate net neutrality, wiretapping, packet inspection, and other such anachronisms.”). 
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I further explores key U.S. legislative and executive reactions to Iran’s so-
called “Twitter Revolution.”24 Finally, Part I discusses the role of 
anonymity network Tor during the Iranian uprising and explains how this 
technology is amenable to both infringing and noninfringing uses. 
Part II paints a picture of Tor litigation as it is likely to emerge—in the 
context of illegal file sharing made untraceable by the union of Tor and 
BitTorrent. This Part describes potential theories of liability, concluding 
that (absent safe harbor immunity) a theory of contributory infringement is 
the likeliest to prevail against a Tor operator whose service allegedly 
facilitates copyright infringement. 
Part III addresses statutory safe harbor under the DMCA, arguing that 
Tor operators, like many Internet service providers, should enjoy § 512(a) 
safe harbor protection from monetary liability in a copyright infringement 
action. Tor operators meet § 512’s general conditions of eligibility and 
specifically qualify for immunity under § 512(a) as mere conduits of digital 
communication. Part III explains how this statutory defense, which failed 
file-sharing defendants like Napster, can prevail for Tor operators. 
The statutory safe harbor shields defendants from monetary liability 
only and would leave Tor operators vulnerable to injunctive action 
following a finding of copyright infringement.25 Anticipating the balancing 
of interests that would confront a court in deciding whether to grant such 
equitable relief, Part IV argues that the likely harm to a Tor operator’s First 
Amendment interests militates against the use of injunctive remedies. By 
allowing speakers to disseminate news free from persecution, the operator 
exercises a protected right to receive information, and this speech-
facilitating conduct is itself a form of speech warranting protection. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Internet freedom abroad is deeply entwined with U.S. foreign policy 
objectives ranging from human rights and freedom of expression to broader 
goals of democratization.26 But the Internet and its “vast democratic 
forums”27 remain quite vulnerable to censorship and perversion by 
 
24  Early mainstream media reports were quick to credit the micro-blogging service Twitter with 
fueling prodemocratic unrest in Iran. With hindsight, observers have come to view this characterization 
of Twitter’s role as hyperbolic. See, e.g., Morozov, supra note 7, at 10 (describing the U.S.-media-
constructed narrative of events in Iran as “Iran’s Twitter Revolution”); infra note 48 and accompanying 
text (discussing the debate, largely initiated by Malcolm Gladwell, over the role of social networking in 
Iran’s 2009 uprising). 
25  See infra note 154 and accompanying text. 
26  See Internet Freedom, U.S. DEP’T ST., http://www.state.gov/e/eb/cip/netfreedom (last visited July 
2, 2012) (reconfirming the State Department’s commitment to “defense of a free, open, and 
interconnected Internet as a U.S. foreign policy priority”). 
27  Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997) (striking down a portion of the Communications 
Decency Act of 1996 on First Amendment overbreadth grounds). 
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oppressive governments. States like China,28 Saudi Arabia,29 and Iran30 have 
long used the Internet to stifle dissent. And more recently in 2011, popular 
uprisings across the Arab world have set the region ablaze and brought the 
interplay of digital communication and democratization into sharp public 
focus.31 In these places, blogging—arguably the apotheosis of free speech in 
the digital age—is often met with a gauntlet of online censorship, 
government surveillance, and licensing schemes32 designed to silence 
dissent. Through the lens of Iran’s 2009 uprising, this Part explores the 
problem of Internet censorship in Iran, key U.S. legislative and executive 
 
28  For example, in 2005, Chinese users of Microsoft’s MSN Spaces blogging service learned that 
the company had bowed to their government’s censorship scheme by blocking blog titles that used terms 
like “freedom” and “democracy.” JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? 95 
(2006). Goldsmith and Wu point to China as an example of “what a government that really wants to 
control Internet communications can accomplish.” Id. at 89. For a discussion of Chinese censorship and 
circumvention efforts, see Jennifer Shyu, Comment, Speak No Evil: Circumventing Chinese Censorship, 
45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 211, 225–29, 240–43 (2008). 
29  The Saudi censorship machine is extensive but less aggressive than China’s. GOLDSMITH & WU, 
supra note 28, at 74. The Saudi government-owned Internet infrastructure can filter and block all web 
traffic flowing into the Kingdom. Id. According to a 2004 OpenNet Initiative report, some of the most 
aggressively blocked websites were those providing “information about tools to circumvent the 
government’s filtering, and sites that promote[d] religious dialogue between Muslims and Christians.” 
Id. 
30  Iran is discussed infra Part I.A. 
31  For example, the Egyptian government took the radical step of shutting down all Internet service 
following mass anti-Mubarak protests in January 2011. See David Kravets, Egypt’s Last-Standing ISP 
Goes Dark, WIRED (Jan. 31, 2011, 6:55 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/01/egypt-isp-
shuttered. When service was restored, the global online community mobilized to help Egyptian 
protesters safely reconnect to the outside world through Tor. See, e.g., phobos, Protecting Your Internet 
Traffic in Volatile Times, TOR BLOG (Feb. 2, 2011), https://blog.torproject.org/blog/protecting-your-
internet-traffic-volatile-times (encouraging readers to “join the Tor network to help others” remain 
anonymous and expressing concern over the possibility that Egyptian Internet traffic “is being recorded 
and possibly saved for future use”); Susannah Vila, 5 Things You Can Do to Support Egyptians from 
Anywhere, MOVEMENTS.ORG (Jan. 28, 2011), http://www.movements.org/blog/entry/egypt-what-can-
you-do (encouraging readers to help Egyptians browse the Internet anonymously by running a Tor 
relay). Recognizing the role of social networking in securing Mubarak’s eventual ouster, one grateful 
Egyptian man went so far as to name his daughter “Facebook.” See David Murphy, Egyptian Man 
Names Daughter ‘Facebook,’ PCMAG.COM (Feb. 20, 2011, 10:37 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/
0,2817,2380670,00.asp. 
32  For a discussion of the proposed Saudi licensing scheme, see Alexia Tsotsis, Saudi Arabians Will 
Soon Need a License to Blog, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.techcrunch.com/2010/09/23/
saudi-arabians-will-soon-need-a-license-to-blog (“[A]ll Saudi Arabian web publishers and online media, 
including blogs and forums, will need to be officially registered with the government.”). Saudi bloggers 
already face ill-defined ex post criminal liability for posting content that violates social or religious 
“values.” See, e.g., Blogger Fouad al Farhan Freed After More than Four Months in Prison, 
REPORTERS SANS FRONTIÈRES (Apr. 28, 2008), http://en.rsf.org/IMG/article_PDF/saudi-arabia-blogger-
fouad-al-farhan-freed-28-04-2008,26746.pdf (“[B]logger Fouad al Farhan . . . had been held in prison 
since 10 December 2007[] for posting an article on his blog discussing the ‘advantages’ and 
‘disadvantages’ of being a Muslim.”). For a comprehensive report on Internet censorship and 
surveillance in Saudi Arabia, see ACCESS CONTROLLED: THE SHAPING OF POWER, RIGHTS, AND RULE IN 
CYBERSPACE 561–570 (Ronald Diebert el al. eds., 2010). 
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reactions to this problem, and the salutary role played by the anonymity 
network Tor. 
A. Iran: The Middle East’s Largest Prison for Journalists and Netizens33 
“Control has no meaning on the Internet . . . . It would crash like the 
Berlin Wall.” 
–Shaban Shahidi Moadab, Deputy Press Minister, 
Iranian Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance34 
 
Sadly for the Iranian civil rights movement, it is Mr. Shahidi Moadab’s 
prophecy—not control over the Internet—that has “crashed.” The Islamic 
Republic of Iran boasts one of the world’s most comprehensive and 
sophisticated Internet censorship machines.35 Theirs is an attempted 
panoptic use of the Internet, designed to induce self-censorship.36 
Iran routes all web traffic through a government-run Internet backbone, 
allowing the regime to target and block content relating to human rights, 
women’s rights, political reform, government criticism, religious minorities, 
criticism of Islam, sexuality, and a broad range of topics it considers 
immoral.37 Iran’s Press Law38 further restricts speech through a licensing 
 
33  REPORTERS SANS FRONTIÈRES, WORLD DAY AGAINST CYBER CENSORSHIP 20 (2010), 
http://en.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/Internet_enemies.pdf (“With some sixty journalists and bloggers behind bars 
and another fifty forced to seek asylum elsewhere, the Islamic Republic of Iran has become the largest 
prison in the Middle East—and one of the world’s largest prisons—for journalists and netizens.”). 
Merriam-Webster defines “netizen” as “an active participant in the online community of the Internet.” 
Netizen, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/netizen (last visited July 2, 
2011). 
34  Mr. Shahidi Moadab was quoted in Nazila Fathi, Taboo Surfing: Click Here for Iran . . ., N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 4, 2002, at C5 (internal quotation marks omitted). There, the author mistakenly identified 
the speaker as “Shaaban Sahidi.” See id. 
35  DIEBERT ET AL., supra note 32, at 555. 
36  For a discussion of the Foucauldian reinterpretation of Bentham’s Panopticon in the context of 
government surveillance and censorship in Iran and China, see Cameron J. Shahab & Reza Mousoli, Cat 
and Mouse in Cyberspace: A Case Study of China vs Iran, IRANIAN.COM (Sept. 10, 2010), http://
www.iranian.com/main/2010/sep/cat-and-mouse-cyberspace. Michel Foucault, who visited Iran during 
the height of the 1978 anti-Shah protests, was highly critical of the Shah’s secret police and their 
surveillance tactics. See JANET AFARY & KEVIN B. ANDERSON, FOUCAULT AND THE IRANIAN 
REVOLUTION 2 (2005); Shahab & Mousoli, supra. 
37  DIEBERT ET AL., supra note 32, at 553–55. The Iranian regime is also working on its very own, 
“clean” version of the Internet—“an insular nationwide intranet that is reportedly isolated from the 
regular Internet” and that “would be heavily regulated by the government.” Ryan Paul, Iran Moving 
Ahead with Plans for National Intranet, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 9, 2012, 10:10 PM), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2012/04/iran-plans-to-unplug-the-internet-launch-its-own-
clean-alternative.ars. 
38  QANUNI MATBU’AT [PRESS LAW] Tehran 1381 [2002], arts. 1, 6 (Iran) (defining “press” as 
including “[a]ll electronic publications” and explaining that “[t]he [p]ress is free, except for items which 
undermine Islam’s bases and commandments, and public and private rights”), translated in Iran Data 
Portal—Press Law, PRINCETON UNIV., http://www.princeton.edu/irandataportal/legislation/press-law 
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scheme that puts bloggers and website operators under government 
regulatory authority.39 Unlicensed speakers face criminal prosecution and 
punishment for speech-based crimes ranging from imprisonment to death.40 
Such harsh consequences create a very real need for anonymity technology 
to shield bloggers’ IP addresses and hence their identities.41 
Perhaps as a testament to its fractured leadership, the run-up to Iran’s 
hotly disputed June 2009 presidential election saw a surge in online 
censorship targeting prominent political figures including former President 
Mohammad Khatami42 and presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi.43 
In the election aftermath, amid street demonstrations and widespread 
allegations of vote-rigging, the Iranian censors launched an undeclared war 
on social networking.44 With the foreign press almost entirely banned from 
reporting on the election fallout,45 the task of documenting this historic 
clash fell to Iran’s citizen journalists.46 Their contraband—uncensored 
 
(last updated Aug. 3, 2011). 
39  DIEBERT ET AL., supra note 32, at 550; see also Article 19, Memorandum on Media Regulation in 
the Islamic Republic of Iran 8–9, UNHCR REFWORLD (May 2, 2006), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/
docid/475e4e270.html (discussing the Iranian licensing scheme and characterizing it as both a “matter of 
serious concern” and “a violation of the right to freedom of expression”). For a discussion of regulatory 
restrictions faced by Middle Eastern bloggers, see Mohamed Abdel Dayem, Middle East Bloggers: The 
Street Leads Online, COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (Oct. 14, 2009), 
http://www.cpj.org/reports/2009/10/middle-east-bloggers-the-street-leads-online.php. 
40  Punishable offenses include insulting Islam and criticizing state officials. DIEBERT ET AL., supra 
note 32, at 550; see also TA’AZIRAT [PENAL CODE] Tehran 1991, arts. 513–514, 609 (Iran), available at 
http://mehr.org/Islamic_Penal_Code_of_Iran.pdf (last visited July 2, 2010) (criminalizing speech that 
insults, inter alia, “the Islamic sanctities or any of the imams,” the Prophet Muhammad, or “the leaders 
of the three branches of the government”). 
41  Ethan Zuckerman, a researcher at Harvard University’s Berkman Center for Internet and Society, 
has developed a guide for anonymous blogging that combines Tor, the blogging platform WordPress, 
and the use of free email accounts to produce a “very high level of anonymity.” Ethan Zuckerman, 
Anonymous Blogging with Wordpress & Tor, GLOBAL VOICES ONLINE (Sept. 4, 2009, 6:03 PM), http://
advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/projects/guide. 
42  For example, Iran began blocking access to Khatami’s website yarinews.org in February 2009. 
DIEBERT ET AL., supra note 32, at 553. 
43  See id. (explaining that “[m]any believe that supporters of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 
were behind the blocking orders” targeting Facebook, as opposition candidate “Mousavi[] had been 
using Facebook for political organizing”). 
44  See REPORTERS SANS FRONTIÈRES, supra note 33, at 19 (“Iran’s regime considers social 
networks to be instruments of the opposition. Facebook and Twitter, which relayed the calls for 
demonstrations, have been continuously blocked since June 2009. MySpace.com and Orkut.com have 
received the same treatment.”). 
45  Chaos Prevails as Protesters, Police Clash in Iranian Capital, CNN.COM (June 21, 2009, 
4:37AM), http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/06/20/iran.election/index.html [hereinafter Chaos 
Prevails] (“The Ministry of Culture on Saturday banned international media from reporting on the 
demonstrations unless they receive permission from Iranian authorities. A freelance journalist said it was 
‘very dangerous’ to take pictures.”). 
46  A message on losing presidential candidate Mousavi’s Facebook page, posted during the height 
of the June 2009 postelection protests, captured this sentiment: “Today you are the media . . . . It is your 
duty to report and keep the hope alive.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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accounts of peaceful street protests and a brutal government response—
found its way to U.S. consumers thanks (in part) to cell phone technology, 
YouTube, and the volunteer efforts of world netizens who posted, 
retweeted, and shared news with the wired community.47 And although the 
significance of social networking in aiding communication and activism 
within Iran is in dispute,48 there can be little doubt that these tools played a 
crucial role in getting unfiltered news out of Iran.49 Citizen journalism 
would be of little use without an effective news dissemination mechanism, 
and effective dissemination is precisely what the online community 
delivered. Netizens ensured that when the Iranian government killed 
peaceful protester Neda Agha-Soltan50 in cold blood and in broad daylight, 
the YouTube-connected world was watching.51 
To the Iranian government, these amateur videographers and other 
citizen journalists were dissidents, and their methods of news dissemination 
 
47  Former deputy national security adviser Mark Pfeifle went so far as to suggest that Twitter might 
deserve a Nobel Peace Prize for having “uniquely documented and personalized the story of hope, 
heroism, and horror in Iran.” Mark Pfeifle, A Nobel Peace Prize for Twitter?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 
July 6, 2009, at 22, 22.  
48  Malcolm Gladwell is perhaps the most vocal critic of the idea that social networking can effect 
real social change. Regarding the role of Twitter in Iran’s post-election uprising, he observed that “the 
people tweeting about the demonstrations were almost all in the West.” Malcolm Gladwell, Small 
Change: Why the Revolution Will Not Be Tweeted, NEW YORKER, Oct. 4, 2010, at 42, 44. For Twitter 
co-founder Biz Stone’s response to Gladwell, see Biz Stone, Exclusive: Biz Stone on Twitter and 
Activism, ATLANTIC (Oct. 19, 2010, 8:19 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2010/10/
exclusive-biz-stone-on-twitter-and-activism/64772 (“Twitter users played their roles in . . . the political 
unrest in Iran but Mr. Gladwell is keen to downplay their efforts—and the fact that former national-
security adviser Mark Pfeifle called for Twitter to be nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize seems only to 
have ruffled his feathers.”). Stone argues that the “leaderless, self-organizing systems” that Gladwell 
dismissed as incapable of truly challenging the status quo are instead “the very embodiment of change” 
because they lower the bar to activism and allow individuals to act as one toward a common goal. Id. 
49  See, e.g., Sara Ledwith, Iran’s Neda Shows Citizen Journalism Unleashed, REUTERS (June 23, 
2009, 2:36 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE55M3AJ20090623 (“Since Reuters and other 
foreign media are subject to Iranian restrictions on their ability to report, film or take pictures in Tehran, 
they increasingly depend on people like the one on whose cameraphone Neda’s death was recorded.”). 
50  Neda, whose name in Persian means “voice,” became the voice of Iran’s freedom movement. See 
Times Topics: Neda Agha-Soltan, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2009), http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/
reference/timestopics/people/s/neda_agha_soltan/index.html. The story of Neda’s life, her video-
recorded death, and her enduring legacy are well-told in the HBO documentary film For Neda. For a 
synopsis, see HBO: For Neda: Synopsis, HBO, http://www.hbo.com/documentaries/for-neda/index.
html#/documentaries/for-neda/synopsis.html (last visited July 2, 2012). 
51  The grainy cell phone video of Neda’s death is widely available online. See, e.g., Xeni Jardin, 
Iran: Neda (Warning: Graphic Video), BOINGBOING (June 21, 2009, 11:50 AM), http://www.
boingboing.net/2009/06/21/iran-neda-warning-gr.html#previouspost. On the day of Neda’s death, 
President Barack Obama warned the Iranian government that the world was, indeed, watching. See Press 
Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement of the President on Iran (June 20, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statement-from-the-President-on-Iran (“The Iranian 
government must understand that the world is watching. We mourn each and every innocent life that is 
lost. We call on the Iranian government to stop all violent and unjust actions against its own people.”). 
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were tools of subversion.52 Blogger Jila Bani Yaghoob, winner of the 2010 
“Reporters Without Borders Freedom of Expression” award, was arrested 
along with her husband and twenty other journalists during an election 
protest.53 She was sentenced to one year in prison and was banned from 
working as a journalist for the next thirty years, and her husband received a 
five-year prison sentence.54 Other activists soon learned that even their 
instant messaging activity—an ostensibly private mode of 
communication—could land them in jail.55 As of March 30, 2012, the 
Threatened Voices project was actively tracking 316 Iranian bloggers who 
had been threatened or arrested by the Iranian government.56 
The postelection wave of arrests57 is perhaps not surprising in light of 
Iran’s robust online surveillance apparatus,58 which is aided by Western 
technology,59 and Iran’s well-documented animosity toward press 
freedom.60 Nevertheless, these arrests helped shine a floodlight on the 
 
52  REPORTERS SANS FRONTIÈRES, supra note 33, at 19 (discussing Iranian Internet filtration, 
surveillance, blogger arrests, cyber-dissidence, and the government’s desire to “block the transmission 
via the Internet of photos taken with a cell phone”). 
53  Cracking Down Remorselessly, Tehran Shows Its True Face, REPORTERS SANS FRONTIÈRES 
(Oct. 28, 2010), http://en.rsf.org/iran-cracking-down-remorselessly-tehran-28-10-2010,38693.html. 
54  Id. 
55  Internet Filtering in Iran, OPENNET INITIATIVE 7 (June 16, 2009), http://opennet.net/sites/
opennet.net/files/ONI_Iran_2009.pdf (“Women’s rights activists reported that they were shown 
transcripts of instant messaging sessions by authorities after their arrest, which, if true, would support 
the existence of an advanced surveillance program.”). 
56  Threatened Voices—Iran, GLOBAL VOICES ONLINE, http://threatened.globalvoicesonline.org/
bloggers/iran (last visited July 2, 2012). These statistics reveal a sharp increase in blogger arrests 
beginning in 2009. Id.; see also Press Freedom Violations Recounted in Real Time (from July to 
December 2010), REPORTERS SANS FRONTIÈRES, http://en.rsf.org/iran-press-freedom-violations-
recounted-09-09-2010,37863.html (last updated Feb. 11, 2011) (cataloging the legal entanglements of 
Iranian journalists and bloggers). 
57  See, e.g., REPORTERS SANS FRONTIÈRES, supra note 33 (discussing the postelection arrests of 
blogger and human rights activist Shiva Nazar Ahrari as well as cyber-dissident Mojtaba Lotfi). 
58  See Internet Filtering in Iran, supra note 55, at 6 (“Iran is reportedly investing in improving its 
technical capacity to extensively monitor the behavior of its citizens on the Internet. The routing of 
Internet traffic through proxy servers offers the potential for monitoring and logging essentially all 
unencrypted Web traffic, including e-mail, instant messaging and browsing. The architecture of the 
Iranian Internet is particularly conducive to widespread surveillance as all traffic from the dozens of 
ISPs serving households is routed through the state-controlled telecommunications infrastructure . . . .”). 
59  See id. at 6–7 (“In 2008, two European companies reportedly sold a sophisticated electronic 
surveillance system capable of monitoring Internet use that could be utilized for tracking and monitoring 
the online activities of human rights organizations and political dissidents. [The state-controlled 
Telecommunication Company of Iran] is said to have received the equipment from Nokia Siemens 
Networks, a joint venture between the Finnish cell phone maker and the German company Siemens.”). 
60  Iran ranks a miserable 172 out of 175 on the Reporters Sans Frontières Press Freedom Index, 
owing to its “[a]utomatic prior censorship, state surveillance of journalists, mistreatment, journalists 
forced to flee the country, illegal arrests and imprisonment.” Press Freedom Index 2009, REPORTERS 
SANS FRONTIÈRES, http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2009,1001.html (last visited July 2, 2012). Iran 
is at the “gates of the infernal trio” occupied by Turkmenistan, North Korea, and Eritrea—places “where 
the media are so suppressed they are non-existent.” Id. 
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importance of unfiltered Internet access and online anonymity to U.S. 
democratization efforts abroad and U.S. access to world news; likewise, the 
arrests focused attention on the role to be played by volunteer-operated 
anonymity networks like Tor.61 
B. The Official U.S. Reaction 
Twitter’s role in the Iranian story garnered so much media attention62 
that on June 16, 2009, the U.S. State Department asked the website to delay 
its scheduled maintenance in an effort to keep the service available to 
Iranian protesters.63 The following month, the U.S. Senate added the 
Victims of Iranian Censorship (VOICE) Act to a defense spending bill 
authorizing up to $50 million in federal funding “to help Iranians evade 
their government’s attempts to censor the Internet.”64 Enacted in October 
2009, the VOICE Act explicitly authorizes spending to “develop additional 
proxy server capabilit[ies] and anti-censorship software” so that users in 
Iran may bypass Iranian government censorship of U.S.-funded Persian-
language news websites.65 
The VOICE Act also created the Iranian Electronic Education, 
Exchange, and Media Fund, a U.S. Treasury fund, to facilitate the 
development of technologies that will help the Iranian people “gain access 
to and share information; . . . exercise freedom of speech, freedom of 
expression, and freedom of assembly through the Internet and other 
electronic media; . . . and . . . counter efforts . . . to block, censor, and 
monitor the Internet.”66 Recent changes to U.S. export regulations continued 
 
61  See, e.g., Cyrus Farivar, How Geeks (and Non-Geeks) Can Help Iranians Online, FRONTLINE 
(July 17, 2009, 2:36 PM), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2009/07/how-geeks-
and-non-geeks-can-help-iranians-online.html (“[T]here already is a growing legion of people worldwide 
who are helping Iranians improve access to the heavily-filtered and significantly slower [Iranian] 
Internet. Some have installed a piece of software called Tor on their home computers.”). 
62  See Morozov, supra note 7, at 10 (“In the first days after the protests, it was hard to find a 
television network or a newspaper . . . that didn’t run a feature or an editorial extolling the role of 
Twitter in fomenting and publicizing the Iranian protests.”). 
63  See Daily Press Briefing, Ian Kelly, Spokesman, U.S. Department of State (June 16, 2009), 
available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2009/jun/124991.htm; Sue Pleming, U.S. State 
Department Speaks to Twitter over Iran, REUTERS (June 16, 2009, 3:26 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSWBT01137420090616 (“The U.S. State Department said on 
Tuesday it had contacted the social networking service Twitter to urge it to delay a planned upgrade that 
would have cut daytime service to Iranians who are disputing their election.”). More than one year after 
the election protests, the State Department continued to recognize the ability of social networking to 
foment social change. See, e.g., Reza Aslan, Tweeting to Iran, DAILY BEAST (Feb. 20, 2011, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/02/20/tweeting-to-iran.html (reporting that the State 
Department launched its own Persian-language Twitter feed). 
64  Eli Lake, Senate OKs Funds to Help Thwart Iran Web Censors: Measure Aims to Circumvent 
“Cruel Regime,” WASH. TIMES, July 26, 2009, at A1. 
65  Victims of Iranian Censorship Act, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 1261–1266, 123 Stat. 2190, 2553–55 
(2009) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6201, 6204 (2006)). 
66  Id. § 1263(c). In 2010, the House of Representatives considered, but ultimately did not pass, a 
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in a similar vein, “authorizing the exportation of certain Internet-based 
personal communications services and software,” such as social networking 
and blogging services, to Iran.67 
U.S. investment in Iranian democratization predates the 2009 election 
uprising. The State Department spent $31 million in 2007 and appropriated 
another $60 million in 2008, all with the goal of promoting free speech and 
democracy in Iran.68 These funds enabled Voice of America Broadcasting to 
invest in a Tor-embedded, Persian-language version of the Firefox web 
browser.69 Tor, in turn, allowed Iranian dissidents to access government-
blocked websites, evade government detection, and generally “give 
Ahmadinejad’s Web censors headaches.”70 
C. Tor: What Lawyers Should Know About Onion Routing 
Tor primarily bills itself as a privacy and civil liberties tool (rather than 
a way of bypassing censorship71) and it discourages use of the Tor network 
for file-sharing purposes.72 Tor uses “onion routing”—a technology 
originally developed by the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory to protect 
government communications.73 Tor anonymizes74 its users’ Internet activity 
 
related bill calling for the creation of an Internet Freedom Foundation. The foundation would have 
awarded grants to “develop deployable technologies to defeat Internet suppression and censorship” by 
foreign governments. Internet Freedom Act of 2010, H.R. 4784, 111th Cong. §§ 3, 5 (2010). 
67  Cuban Assets Control Regulations; Sudanese Sanctions Regulations; Iranian Transactions 
Regulations, 75 Fed. Reg. 10,997, 10,998 (Mar. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 560); see also 
Mark Landler, U.S. Hopes Exports of Internet Services Will Help Open Closed Societies, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 8, 2010, at A4 (discussing the Obama Administration’s decision to allow the exporting of online 
services to Iran). For a discussion of the First Amendment implications of U.S.–Iran trade sanctions, see 
infra note 212 and accompanying text. 
68  Eli Lake, Protestors Use Navy Technology to Avoid Censorship, WASH. TIMES, June 26, 2010, at 
A1. Lake quoted former State Department Iran democracy program coordinator David Denehy, who 
said the program’s goal was “to promote freedom of speech for Iranians to communicate with each other 
and the outside world.” Id.  
69  Id. Tor is now available as a component of the Tor Browser Bundle for the Firefox browser. See 
Tor Project: Torbutton, TOR PROJECT, https://www.torproject.org/torbutton (last updated Dec. 17, 
2011).  
70  Lake, supra note 68 (quoting Wired.com’s national security blog editor, Noah Schachtman) 
(internal quotation mark omitted). 
71  See Roger Dingledine, Ten Things To Look For in a Circumvention Tool, TOR PROJECT 6 (Sept. 
16, 2010), https://www.torproject.org/press/presskit/2010-09-16-circumvention-features.pdf (explaining 
that publicity, while beneficial, can attract the ire of censors who may choose to block a particular tool 
merely to create a repressive veneer and induce self-censorship). 
72  See Elec. Frontier Found., Legal FAQ for Tor Relay Operators, TOR PROJECT, 
http://www.torproject.org/eff/tor-legal-faq.html.en (last updated Aug. 24, 2011) [hereinafter EFF, Legal 
FAQ] (advising against the use of Tor for illegal purposes and explaining that “Tor has been developed 
to be a tool for free expression, privacy, and human rights”); Tor FAQ, TOR PROJECT, https://www.
torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en (last visited July 2, 2012) (explaining that the Tor service is slow in part 
because many users “don’t understand or care that Tor can’t currently handle file-sharing traffic load”). 
73  Inception, supra note 11; see also Brief Selected History, ONION ROUTING, http://www.onion-
router.net/History.html (last visited July 2, 2012) (chronicling a brief selected history of onion routing, 
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by funneling web traffic through a series of encrypted virtual tunnels.75 
These tunnels are made possible by a distributed, volunteer-run network of 
Tor operators—individuals who run Tor software on their computers for the 
benefit of others.76 New operators join, and thereby expand, the Tor network 
with the understanding that their efforts can help protect the anonymity of 
endangered citizen journalists and human rights activists in countries like 
Iran and China.77 
As information travels from one Tor operator’s tunnel to another, the 
software adds a new “layer” of encryption (hence the onion metaphor) such 
that no operator in the circuit can ever trace the transmission back more 
than one layer, protecting the Tor user who initiated it.78 Tor operators 
called “relay nodes” pass information along the circuit and an “exit node” 
operator hands off the transmission to the user’s intended destination.79 That 
destination might be a website, an instant messaging server, or any other 
online service that users wish to access without revealing their true IP 
addresses.80 From the destination’s perspective, the transmission appears to 
come directly from the exit node; indeed the transmission bears the exit 
node operator’s IP address.81 
The Tor network’s decentralized architecture and its reliance on 
volunteer operators are of potential legal import and therefore deserve 
further explanation. Centralized networks route all user activity through 
computers operated by a single entity.82 Perhaps the most famous example 
 
from its origins in 1995 as a project funded by the Office of Naval Research through 2004, when U.S. 
government ceased funding Tor). The name “Tor” derives from an acronym, T.O.R. signifying “The 
Onion Router.” See Tor Project: FAQ, supra note 72. 
74  Achieving anonymity, in the Internet context, requires a two-pronged approach. First, the user 
must establish an anonymous Internet connection (one that does not reveal the user’s unique IP address). 
This capability is the province of Tor and other anonymity services. Second, users must anonymize the 
contents of their communications. Users who interact with websites that offer transport layer security or 
“TLS” (indicated by the use of “https://” instead of “http://”) enjoy this type of anonymity. See, e.g., 
Abbott, supra note 10, at 24 (discussing TLS in the context of a Tor user who visits https://secure.
wikileaks.org). 
75  Tor: Overview, supra note 11. For a brief video illustrating this process, see Conrad Warre, How 
Tor Works, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 21, 2009), http://www.technologyreview.com/video/?vid=315. 
76  Tor: Overview, supra note 11. 
77  See Inception, supra note 11; What Is a Tor Relay?, supra note 11 (“Working together, we can 
improve the network for everyone and protect the anonymity of Tor users all over the world.”). 
78  See Abbott, supra note 10, at 23 (explaining how Tor builds multiple circuits thereby ensuring 
that “no one person is ever able to trace activity back to a particular user”); Tor: Overview, supra note 
11. 
79  Abbott, supra note 10, at 23. While relay and exit node operators are listed publicly, a third type 
of operator (called a “bridge node”) remains hidden from public view and reserves its services for users 
whose governments actively censor the Internet. Id. 
80  Id. at 22. 
81  See id. at 26. The fact that all Tor users take on the IP addresses of their exit node operators 
exposes the latter to liability for the former’s wrongdoing. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
82  DINGLEDINE, supra note 71, at 3 (“A centralized tool puts all of its users’ requests through one or 
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of a centralized file-sharing tool was Napster, whose servers maintained an 
index of MP3 song files available to download from its users.83 
Tor is decentralized in the sense that the software itself routes all user 
activity through a series of volunteer operators, and no single entity 
monitors or controls the process.84 In essence, the software does everything 
short of funding itself and updating its own code—functions currently 
performed by TorProject.org. Running in “client mode,” Tor offers the user 
anonymity and access to censored websites. In “server mode,” it adds the 
computer to a worldwide network of Tor operators who facilitate 
anonymous, unfiltered web access for Tor users.85 This decentralized design 
allows the Tor service to endure in the absence of an overseeing entity.86 
As with many Internet innovations, Tor technology is a double-edged 
sword.87 The same anonymity technology that can save an Iranian 
dissident’s life can make a direct infringer untraceable to the copyright 
holder.88 And from Tor’s perspective, a government-blocked website looks 
the same as Hulu.com’s IP filtration scheme that permits access only to 
 
a few servers that the tool operator controls.”). 
83  See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1012, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming an 
injunction “against Napster’s participation in copyright infringement” and determining that “Napster 
may be vicariously liable when it fails to affirmatively use its ability to patrol its system and preclude 
access to potentially infringing files listed in its search index”). 
84  DINGLEDINE, supra note 71, at 3 (“A decentralized design like Tor . . . sends the traffic through 
multiple different locations, so there is no single location or entity that gets to watch what websites each 
user is accessing.”). 
85  Eric J. Stieglitz, Note, Anonymity on the Internet: How Does It Work, Who Needs It, and What 
Are Its Policy Implications?, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1395, 1402–03 (2007) (discussing Tor in 
the context of tools that allow Internet users, including Chinese dissidents, to bypass censorship). 
86  See Abbott, supra note 10, at 26 (“Tor is not Napster. There is no central authority to shut down 
and no key technology to outlaw.”); see also DINGLEDINE, supra note 71, at 2 (comparing Tor to 
Psiphon, Java Anon Proxy, Freegate, and Ultrareach—censorship-bypass tools that do not have 
volunteer-operated networks). A similarly decentralized architecture has made Gnutella, another file-
sharing network, notoriously difficult to shut down. Less than one month after the court-ordered 
injunction of the LimeWire service (a popular Gnutella client), LimeWire Pirate Edition emerged, 
courtesy of an unknown development team. See Arista Records LLC v. Lime Wire LLC, No. 06 Civ. 
05936 (KMW), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115675, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2010) (granting a permanent 
injunction against Lime Wire LLC); Chloe Albanesius, Report: LimeWire ‘Resurrected’ by Secret Dev 
Team, PCMAG.COM (Nov. 9, 2010, 5:50 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2372412,00.asp 
(“LimeWire Pirate Edition should work better than the last functioning version of LimeWire (5.5.10), 
and it should keep working for longer. There’s no adware or spyware: the piratical monkeys are doing 
this for the benefit of the community.” (quoting an anonymous source) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
87  Speaking in the context of liberation technology, Professor Diamond observes that, “[i]n the end, 
technology is merely a tool, open to both noble and nefarious purposes” but notes that innovative 
citizens in places like Iran can use these tools to bring down authoritarianism. Diamond, supra note 4, at 
71, 80. 
88  Lawrence Lessig makes a similar (if more dramatic) point, noting that, “technologies that enable 
Aung San Suu Kyi to continue to push for democracy in Burma will enable Al Qaeda to continue to 
wage its terrorist war against the United States.” LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, at 225 (2006). 
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U.S. web users89—both are roadblocks easily bypassed by routing traffic 
through operators in other locations. 
On one hand, some see Tor as a “beacon of democracy.”90 In June 
2009, as U.S. media found themselves sifting through Twitter feeds for 
news on the Iranian situation,91 the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) (a 
U.S.-based nonprofit organization dedicated to defending civil rights in the 
“digital world”) urged “[t]hose looking to help fight censorship” in Iran to 
become Tor operators.92 Newly minted activists and technophiles around the 
world shared EFF’s sentiment,93 and Tor usage within Iran increased 950% 
during that month.94 Currently, over 42,000 Iranians use Tor on any given 
day.95 
 
89  See Help: International (Outside USA), HULU, http://www.hulu.com/support/article/171122 (last 
visited July 2, 2012) (“Our intention is to make Hulu’s growing content lineup available worldwide as 
quickly as possible. This requires working with the content owners to clear the rights for each show or 
film in each specific region. . . . We don’t have a definite timeline, but we’ll continue to work to make it 
happen.”). Hulu’s filtration scheme demonstrates one way in which websites utilize geolocation—the 
derivation of geographic information from a user’s IP address. For a discussion of geolocation, see King, 
supra note 17. 
90  Abbott, supra note 10. 
91  Golnaz Esfandiari, The Twitter Devolution, FOREIGN POL’Y (June 7, 2010), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/07/the_twitter_revolution_that_wasnt (“Western 
journalists who couldn’t reach—or didn’t bother reaching?—people on the ground in Iran simply 
scrolled through the English-language tweets posted with tag #iranelection.”). Esfandiari argues that 
media reports of Twitter usage within Iran were greatly exaggerated—a position that is not incompatible 
with this Comment’s discussion of social networking as a vehicle for getting unbiased news reports out 
of Iran. 
92  Richard Esguerra, Help Protesters in Iran: Run a Tor Bridge or a Tor Relay, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUND. (June 29, 2009), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/06/help-protesters-iran-run-tor-
relays-bridges. EFF continues to promote Tor as a way to aid Iranian activists. See The EFF Tor 
Challenge, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., http://www.eff.org/torchallenge (last visited July 2, 2012) 
(“Activists worldwide use Tor to protect their anonymity online and to circumvent Internet censorship. 
But they all rely on a limited number of user-provided ‘relays’ to protect themselves and communicate 
with others. Internet users worldwide need your help to make the Tor network stronger and faster, so 
take the Tor Challenge today!”); What Is a Tor Relay?, supra note 11 (describing Tor and quoting an 
anonymous Iranian human rights activist as saying that “we use Tor to access our website and to publish 
to our blog, which is blocked inside of our country”). 
93  See, e.g., DanX, How to Setup a Tor Relay or Tor Bridge, WHY WE PROTEST (June 18, 2009), 
https://whyweprotest.net/community/threads/how-to-setup-a-tor-relay-or-tor-bridge.69952 (describing 
Tor as “something of great value to our friends in Iran”); Cory Doctorow, Run a TOR Node, Help 
Iranians and Others Keep Their Privacy, BOINGBOING (June 29, 2009, 10:34 PM), http://www.
boingboing.net/2009/06/29/run-a-tor-node-help.html (“Whatever you think of Mousavi, I suspect that 
we all agree that Iranian citizens should be allowed to communicate without being spied upon by their 
governments (if only Americans enjoyed this right!).”). 
94  See karsten, Measuring Tor and Iran (Part Two), TOR BLOG (July 1, 2009), http://blog.torproject.
org/blog/measuring-tor-and-iran-part-two. 
95  See Tor Metrics Portal: Users, TOR PROJECT, https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html?graph=
direct-users&country=ir#direct-users (last visited July 2, 2012) (showing a mean of 42,062 daily users 
connecting from Iran). 
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Others view Tor differently—as a “den of thieves and pedophiles”96—
because it can frustrate law enforcement efforts that rely on IP tracking. Tor 
is particularly frustrating in that it does not, at present, give law 
enforcement “backdoor” access to encrypted data.97 And because of its 
decentralized design and multilayered encryption, Tor operators are 
incapable of identifying the sources of transmissions that travel through 
their virtual tunnels.98 An Internet user could theoretically use Tor to remain 
anonymous while engaging in all manner of illegal online activity—from 
defamation to child pornography trafficking99 to material support of 
terrorism.100 Even under court order, a Tor operator would have “no 
incriminating information to turn over.”101 
Although a complete discussion of Tor in the context of wiretap law is 
beyond the scope of this Comment, it is worth noting that Tor operators, 
and providers of similar anonymity technologies, may soon find themselves 
the targets of new legislation requiring backdoor access to encrypted data. 
FBI and NSA officials have urged Congress to propose legislation that 
would require all communication-enabling services to be technically 
capable of complying with wiretap orders.102 Encryption services would 
likely be required to be capable of unscrambling their data and intercepting 
peer-to-peer communications if asked to do so by a court.103 Such legislation 
would undermine Tor’s many positive uses because, once a backdoor is 
 
96  Abbott, supra note 10, at 22. 
97  Tor Project: FAQ, supra note 72 (“There is absolutely no backdoor in Tor. Nobody has asked us 
to put one in, and we know some smart lawyers who say that it’s unlikely that anybody will try to make 
us add one in our jurisdiction (U.S.). If they do ask us, we will fight them, and (the lawyers say) 
probably win.”). 
98  This statement presumes that the Tor operator is using Tor software as intended. Like most 
software, Tor can be hacked. See, e.g., infra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing hacks directed 
at catching child pornography traffickers). 
99  German police have intercepted child pornography trafficked over Tor. See Ryan Singel, German 
Cops Raid Home of Wikileaks and Tor Volunteer—Update, WIRED (Mar. 25, 2009, 12:04 PM), http://
www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/03/wikileaks-domai (reporting a raid on the home of Wikileaks 
supporter and Tor operator, Theodor Reppe, as part of a child pornography investigation). In the United 
States, concerns over Tor-encrypted child-pornography trafficking led security researcher and renowned 
hacker HD Moore to develop a controversial program that can identify child pornographers on the Tor 
network. See Robert Lemos, Tor Hack Proposed to Catch Criminals, SECURITYFOCUS (Mar. 8, 2007), 
http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11447. A representative of the Tor Project pointed out that Moore’s 
program, called “Torment . . . could also be used by authoritarian regimes to track down democracy 
activists or by the United States’ enemies to track down the military intelligence officers that use the 
network.” Id. 
100  The extent of illegal activity over any effective anonymity network is perhaps by its very nature 
impossible to ascertain. That said, there is some evidence of child-pornography trafficking and file 
sharing over the Tor network. See Singel, supra note 99. 
101  Abbott, supra note 10. 
102  Charlie Savage, U.S. Is Working to Ease Wiretaps on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2010, at 
A1. 
103  Id. 
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opened for law enforcement, it is likely only a matter of time before hackers 
and hostile governments find their way in.104 
Whatever the outcome of this proposed legislation, those who view Tor 
as a “den of thieves” may soon find support for their position in the context 
of copyright infringement litigation. The next Part explores the likely shape 
of this litigation: Volunteer Tor operators may find themselves wrongly 
fingered as infringers, blamed for file-sharing activity that passed through 
their virtual tunnels. 
II. LOOKING AHEAD: TOR LITIGATION 
The use of Tor to conceal copyright infringement is, as of this writing, 
an unlitigated area. Nevertheless, Tor operators in the United States are 
almost certain to soon find themselves defendants in copyright infringement 
actions. This Part explores the likely path of Tor litigation as a logical 
consequence of pending actions involving the popular file-sharing protocol 
BitTorrent, as well as the theories of liability likely to be employed against 
Tor operators. 
A. Anonymity and Illegal File Sharing: Tor Meets BitTorrent 
More than a decade ago, former Grateful Dead lyricist and famed 
cyber-libertarian105 John Perry Barlow prophesied that “[t]he future will 
win; there will be no property in cyberspace.”106 Today, those who see Tor 
as a den of copyright thieves might consider it a point for Barlow. File 
sharing continues to be a major source of copyright litigation,107 and 
individuals are using Tor to hide file-sharing activities.108 This marriage of 
 
104  Greek hackers exploited a similar legally mandated backdoor in 2005, prompting Columbia 
University computer science professor Steven M. Bellovin to characterize the FBI–NSA proposal as “a 
disaster waiting to happen.” Id. (quoting Bellovin) (internal quotation mark omitted). The Tor Project 
points out an additional problem with backdoors: “[T]he policy mechanisms needed to ensure correct 
handling of this responsibility are enormous and unsolved.” Abuse FAQ, TOR PROJECT, 
http://www.torproject.org/docs/faq-abuse.html.en (last visited July 2, 2012). 
105  ”Cyberlibertarianism” is an ideology that “emphasizes individual rights, especially online rights, 
as the most important political good.” Alexandra Samuel, Hacktivism and the Future of Democratic 
Discourse, in DEMOCRACY ONLINE 123, 131 (Peter M. Shane ed., 2004). 
106  John Perry Barlow, The Next Economy of Ideas: Will Copyright Survive the Napster Bomb? 
Nope, but Creativity Will, WIRED, OCT. 2000, at 240, 241. 
107  As of January 2011, nearly 100,000 BitTorrent users in the United States had been sued for 
copyright infringement since the start of 2010. Ernesto, 100,000 P2P Users Sued in US Mass Lawsuits, 
TORRENTFREAK (Jan. 30, 2011), http://www.torrentfreak.com/100000-p2p-users-sued-in-us-mass-
lawsuits-110130. By August 2011, that number had doubled. Ernesto, 200,000 BitTorrent Users Sued in 
the United States, TORRENTFREAK (Aug. 8, 2011), http://www.torrentfreak.com/200000-bittorrent-
users-sued-in-the-united-states-110808. 
108  A recent study analyzing BitTorrent usage over the Tor network concluded that “more than half 
of the traffic carried over Tor is BitTorrent.” Abdelberi Chaabane et al., Digging into Anonymous 
Traffic: A Deep Analysis of the Tor Anonymizing Network, NETWORK & SYS. SECURITY, Sept. 1–3, 
2010, at 167, 170, available at http://planete.inrialpes.fr/papers/TorTraffic-NSS10.pdf. The Tor Project 
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anonymity technology and file sharing is perhaps no more surprising than a 
burglar’s decision to wear gloves instead of leaving fingerprints.109 And the 
honeymoon is not likely to be over anytime soon, as increased federal 
funding110 of Tor-like technology will encourage new anonymity and 
censorship-bypass providers to enter the marketplace.111 
District courts in Washington, D.C. are already seeing the likely 
precursors of Tor litigation. In “the most sweeping antipiracy litigation 
since 2003,” thousands of users of the popular file-sharing protocol 
BitTorrent were accused of sharing unauthorized copies of independent 
films including Academy Award-winner The Hurt Locker.112 U.S. 
Copyright Group (USCG), the plaintiff in what has come to be known as 
“Hurt Locker litigation,” filed a number of John Doe infringement suits 
seeking subpoenas forcing the alleged infringers’ ISPs to reveal each user’s 
identity using lists of IP addresses furnished by the plaintiffs.113 If any of the 
true infringers had the presence of mind to mask their IP addresses using 
Tor, the subpoenaed ISPs will reveal the identities of the Tor exit node 
operators whose IP addresses appear, on the surface, to be those of the 
direct infringers.114 Thus, Tor operators may soon find themselves in court 
facing damages of up to $150,000 per illegally copied movie.115 
This type of litigation puts ISPs in the unenviable position of 
potentially having to produce and reveal customer information, but these 
are hardly the only costs incurred by ISPs as a consequence of file sharing. 
ISPs have a business interest in minimizing illegal file-sharing activity 
 
acknowledges widespread file sharing via Tor—an activity that it considers to be abuse. See mikeperry, 
Tips for Running an Exit Node with Minimal Harassment, TOR BLOG (June 30, 2010), 
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tips-running-exit-node-minimal-harassment (“Excessive bittorrent abuse 
over Tor unfortunately means you will likely receive a deluge of DMCA abuse complaints.”). For a 
discussion of DMCA abuse complaints directed at Tor operators, see infra notes 137–38 and 
accompanying text. 
109  Eric Stieglitz arguably predicted the Tor–BitTorrent union back in 2007 when he wrote, 
“[M]usic traders could easily move away from open peer-to-peer software and to anonymous networks 
where their true identity would remain masked from legal process.” Stieglitz, supra note 85, at 1413. 
110  See, e.g., supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text (discussing the VOICE Act). 
111  The Tor Project’s Executive Director Andrew Lewman has said that the “growing amount of 
money available for Web circumvention and activism” will encourage the already observable trend of 
“companies retooling themselves to become circumvention providers.” Lake, supra note 64 (quoting 
Lewman). 
112  Greg Sandoval, Accused ‘Hurt Locker’ Pirates Turn to Law School, CNET NEWS (Nov. 1, 2010, 
5:39 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001_3-20021307-261.html. 
113  See Voltage Pictures, LLC v. Does 1–5,000, 818 F. Supp. 2d 28, 31, 45 (D.D.C. 2011). 
114  For further discussion of this hypothetical scenario see infra note 186 and accompanying text. 
115  These are the damages alleged by USCG in the Hurt Locker litigation. See USCG v. The People, 
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., http://www.eff.org/uscg (last visited July 2, 2012) (“Once the user’s identity is 
known, USCG’s strategy appears to be to threaten a judgment of up to $150,000 per downloaded 
movie—the maximum penalty allowable by law in copyright suits and a very unlikely judgment in cases 
arising from a single noncommercial infringement—in order to pressure the alleged infringers to settle 
quickly for $1,500 to $2,500 per person.”). 
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since these transmissions—typically large music and video files—place 
significant strains on bandwidth. One solution is bandwidth throttling, a 
technique in which ISPs selectively block what they suspect to be file-
sharing traffic.116 ISPs can identify file-sharing traffic through a 
controversial technique called “deep-packet inspection” (DPI).117 For 
example, in 2007, the public learned that one ISP, Comcast, had been using 
DPI to identify and selectively block BitTorrent traffic—a practice that 
initially raised the ire of the FCC.118 The bad news for ISPs is that Tor 
frustrates DPI119 and therefore hinders proactive attempts to thwart 
copyright thievery. 
Tor-facilitated infringement also poses special problems for plaintiffs. 
Unable to trace the direct infringer whose IP remains buried beneath layers 
of Tor encryption and without the prophylaxis of DPI-facilitated ISP 
bandwidth throttling, it stands to reason that copyright holders will soon 
turn to the only identifiable targets: the Tor operators whose IP addresses—
and hence identities—are, for the most part, publicly available. Exit node 
operators face the greatest risk of liability because all Tor users take on the 
IP address of their exit node operator.120 In other words, “[w]hen someone 
does something improper via Tor, the exit node operator often gets 
blamed.”121 
 
116  See, e.g., David Kravets, Comcast Ordered to Allow Free Flow of File Sharing Traffic, WIRED 
(Aug. 1, 2008, 9:03 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/08/fcc-declares-co. ISPs often rely on 
this method of managing the flow of Internet data, also known as “traffic shaping.” See Peter Svensson, 
Comcast Blocks Some Internet Traffic, WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 2007, 6:32 PM), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/19/AR2007101900842.html; see also Kravets, 
supra (reporting that Comcast’s practice of throttling was widespread). 
117  See Kravets, supra note 116. 
118  In re Formal Complaint of Free Press & Pub. Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for Secretly 
Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 FCC Rcd. 13028, 13029–31 (Aug. 1, 2008). The FCC ordered 
Comcast to stop the practice, which it analogized to opening “customers’ mail because [Comcast] wants 
to deliver mail not based on the address or type of stamp on the envelope but on the type of letter 
contained therein.” Id. at 13051. Two years later, an appeals court vacated the FCC’s decision. See 
Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 644 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
119  As discussed supra note 74, Tor encrypts the Internet connection, and users are encouraged to 
take the additional step of encrypting the actual contents of their transmissions. These double-encrypted 
Tor transmissions appear least vulnerable to DPI. See Chaabane et al., supra note 108, at 169 (using DPI 
to analyze Tor network usage and noting that more than 25% of traffic volume remained 
unrecognizable, probably due to encryption); NEDANET, http://nedanet.org (last visited July 2, 2012) 
(“The [Iranian] regime appears to be using deep packet inspection on all traffic in and out of Iran. Do 
not use unencrypted communications for anything sensitive unless you want to be jailed, tortured, and 
killed!”). 
120  See Stjepan Groš et al., Protecting TOR Exit Nodes from Abuse, MIPRO, May 24–28, 2010, at 
1246, 1246 (“[T]he Tor network is abused by the attackers but also people use it for all sorts of illegal 
activities, of which child pornography is probably the most severe. This especially hurts the people who 
run, so called, exit nodes because it seems like this malicious traffic is coming from them, and not from 
those that originated the traffic.”).  
121  Abbott, supra note 10, at 26. 
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Even without the problem of untraceability, suing throngs of direct 
infringers is a Herculean task.122 Thus, in the BitTorrent context, plaintiffs 
have historically pursued the websites that make it possible for individuals 
to find (and share) BitTorrent files.123 One could argue that Tor operators 
are analogous to these BitTorrent clearinghouses in that they 
too facilitate illegal file sharing. 
B. Theories of Liability 
A plaintiff alleging copyright infringement against a Tor operator 
would likely proceed under a theory of contributory infringement because 
the alternate theories of vicarious liability124 and inducement125 are less 
likely to succeed. Vicarious liability is ill-suited because it would require 
showing that the defendant had “an obvious and direct financial interest in 
the exploitation of copyrighted materials.”126 Tor operators gain no financial 
benefit from their actions. If anything, they incur costs in the form of 
reduced bandwidth and computer processing resources.127 
Inducement theory is also ill-suited as a theory of liability because it 
would require the plaintiff to show that the Tor operator intended to induce 
infringement by communicating messages “designed to stimulate others to 
 
122  Indeed plaintiffs in the Hurt Locker litigation were forced to voluntarily dismiss tens of 
thousands of unnamed defendants from the suit because ISPs were releasing user information so slowly 
that plaintiffs could not meet the court’s filing deadlines. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
123  Courts have taken notice of this inherent difficulty when granting injunctive relief to copyright 
holders in actions against BitTorrent indexing websites. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. 
Fung, No. CV 06-5578 SVW (JCx), 2010 Dist. LEXIS 91169, at *8 (C.D. Cal. May 20, 2010) (“[G]iven 
the multiplicity of infringements of Plaintiffs’ works caused by a single user downloading a single dot-
torrent file from Defendants’ sites . . . it would be untenable for Plaintiffs to track and proceed against 
each infringing end-user.” (citation omitted)). 
124  A defendant can be held vicariously liable for copyright infringement activity by a third party if 
the defendant: (1) “possess[es] the right and ability to supervise the infringing conduct” and (2) “ha[s] 
an obvious and direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials.” 3 MELVILLE B. 
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04[A][2] (2011) (footnote omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
125  Under a theory of inducement, a defendant can be held liable for the direct infringement activity 
of a third party if the defendant’s “active steps to encourage infringement lead[] to actual infringement 
taking place.” Id. § 12.04[A][4][a] (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
126  Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963). 
127  See Tor FAQ, supra note 72 (“Tor relays do use a lot of ram. It is not unusual for a fast exit relay 
to use 500–1000 MB of memory.”). Tor exit node operators probably incur the greatest time cost, as 
successful operation of an exit node requires something on the order of an advanced computer science 
degree and a fairly intricate understanding of copyright law. A brief glance at the elaborate response 
templates developed by the Tor community to aid exit node operators in dealing with ISP complaints 
should make this point abundantly clear. See, e.g., Elec. Frontier Found., Response Template for Tor 
Relay Operator to ISP, TOR PROJECT, https://www.torproject.org/eff/tor-dmca-response.html (last 
updated May 31, 2011) [hereinafter EFF, Response Template]; Tor Abuse Templates, TOR PROJECT, 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorAbuseTemplates (last visited July 2, 2012). 
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commit violations.”128 Because this theory, a creature of the Supreme 
Court’s 2005 decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, 
Ltd.,129 has not been heavily tested, it remains unclear whether it could be 
used effectively in the Tor context.130 Nevertheless, inducement theory is 
not likely to succeed against a Tor operator because of one critical 
distinction from the defendant file-sharing services in Grokster: While 
Grokster, Ltd. somewhat blatantly advertised its illegal purpose,131 Tor 
operators (and the Tor Project) typically hold themselves out as a privacy 
and civil liberties tool and they actively discourage illegal file sharing over 
the network.132 Although the Grokster service was structurally analogous to 
Tor in that both networks are decentralized,133 the Grokster-borne 
inducement theory seems ill-suited in the Tor context. 
Instead, plaintiffs will probably proceed under the more promising 
theory of contributory infringement. To prevail under this theory, a plaintiff 
would need to prove that the Tor operator: (1) had knowledge of 
infringement and (2) materially contributed to it.134 The file-sharing service 
Napster was famously enjoined under this theory of liability.135 
Applied to a Tor operator, the first element of contributory 
infringement—knowledge of infringement—is easily satisfied if the 
operator received notice of alleged infringement, e.g., in the form of a 
complaint from the copyright holder136 or (as more commonly happens) 
from the operator’s ISP. When an ISP receives a complaint from a 
copyright holder alleging infringement by one of the ISP’s customers, the 
ISP may forward the notice to the alleged infringer as part of a statutorily 
 
128  Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936–37 (2005). 
129  Id. 
130  Riley, supra note 9, at 607. 
131  Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936–38. 
132  See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. Notably, discouraging file sharing is different 
from policing file sharing—a practice that itself carries risk of liability for the Tor operator. I discuss 
this risk infra notes 181–82 and accompanying text. 
133  Grokster, 545 U.S. at 928. 
134  See Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) 
(defining a contributory infringer as “one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, 
causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another” (footnote omitted)); see also 
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1171 (9th Cir. 2007) (adopting Gershwin as the 
test for contributory liability). 
135  A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit also 
held that Napster was likely to be found liable under a theory of vicarious liability because Napster 
profited directly from infringement and had both the right and ability to police infringing activity as a 
consequence of its centralized server system. Id. at 1022–24. Napster also tried (unsuccessfully) to 
invoke the same statutory safe harbor that this Comment argues should protect Tor operators. See id. at 
1025. For a discussion of why Tor operators can succeed where Napster failed, see infra Part III.C. 
136  Napster was found to have actual knowledge of illegal file sharing partly because plaintiff 
Recording Industry Association of America had placed it on notice of thousands of infringing files. 
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020 n.5. 
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prescribed process commonly known as “notice and takedown.” By 
implementing the notice and takedown regime established in § 512(c) of the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), the ISP lays a foundation for 
its own immunity as a transitory digital communication provider under 
§ 512(a).137 
Tor exit node operators are particularly likely to receive these § 512(c) 
notices, because theirs are the only IP addresses that a destination website 
will ever see.138 Indeed, the risk associated with exit node operation may 
explain why the majority of Tor node operators disallow exit connections 
entirely.139 Exit node operators who find themselves the recipients of 
§ 512(c) notices might choose to respond to the ISP and contest the 
allegations.140 In the context of a contributory infringement action, such a 
response might paradoxically increase the operator’s risk of liability by 
proving the knowledge element. 
Plaintiffs could potentially establish the second element of contributory 
infringement, material contribution to the infringement, by arguing that Tor 
helps individuals access and disseminate infringing material. By 
anonymizing the direct infringer’s Internet activity, the Tor operator 
arguably eliminates a fear of detection that may otherwise discourage such 
activity. 
EFF, a prominent nonprofit organization dedicated to defending civil 
liberties “in the digital world,”141 argues that Tor operators who enable 
others to use the Internet anonymously are performing lawful activities and 
should not be liable for activity occurring in their tunnels.142 Since 2005, 
EFF has actively sought test case volunteers in the hopes of setting “a clear 
legal precedent establishing that merely running a relay does not create 
 
137  See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a), (c) (2006). 
138  See supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text. Tor Project acknowledges this risk and warns 
exit node operators of it. See Abuse FAQ, supra note 104 (“If you run a Tor relay that allows exit 
connections . . . it’s probably safe to say that you will eventually hear from somebody. Abuse 
complaints may come in a variety of forms.”). 
139  See mikeperry, supra note 108 (“[E]xit nodes are typically on the scarce side. Exits usually 
occupy 30–33% of network by capacity, but are currently at a whopping 38.5% . . . .”). 
140  See, e.g., EFF, Response Template, supra note 127 (informing Tor operators that “anyone 
providing routing services may face copyright complaints” but that the DMCA “safe harbors should 
provide protections” to operators and their ISPs). 
141  About EFF, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., http://www.eff.org/about (last visited July 2, 2012). EFF 
has been involved as plaintiff, defense counsel, or amicus curiae in a number of landmark disputes over 
digital rights, including Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005), and 
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). See Legal Victories, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., 
http://www.eff.org/victories (last visited July 2, 2011). 
142  EFF, Legal FAQ, supra note 72 (“[W]e believe that running a Tor relay—including an exit relay 
that allows people to anonymously send and receive traffic—is lawful under U.S. law. . . . EFF believes 
so strongly that those running Tor relays shouldn’t be liable for traffic that passes through the relay that 
we’re running our own middle relay.”). 
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copyright liability for either operators or their bandwidths providers.”143 
EFF’s position will gain support if Tor operators are found to qualify for 
immunity under § 512(a), the safe harbor provision for service providers 
that merely act as conduits for digital communication144—an argument 
presented in the next Part. 
III. TOR OPERATORS AND THE DMCA § 512(A) SAFE HARBOR 
Tor operators live in a fog of uncertainty surrounding secondary 
infringement liability because their services have both infringing and 
noninfringing uses. This specter of liability is, by itself, harmful because it 
discourages new operators from joining the network, particularly as exit 
nodes.145 And in a decentralized, volunteer-run network like Tor, a dearth of 
operators is an existential threat to the overall service. For example, one 
major problem for Tor users is network latency (i.e., slow download and 
upload speeds)—a problem attributable to network size.146 While Tor’s user 
base continues to grow, the growth of its operator network (currently 
estimated at over 2800 active nodes147) has lagged behind, in part due to 
legal uncertainty.148 There is a dearth of exit node operators149—an 
 
143  Id.; see also Roger Dingledine, EFF Is Looking for Tor DMCA Test Case Volunteers, SEUL.ORG 
(Oct. 26, 2005), http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/Oct-2005/msg00208.html (describing the ideal test case 
client). 
144  See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2006). 
145  See Tsuen-Wan “Johnny” Ngan et al., Building Incentives into Tor, in FINANCIAL 
CRYPTOGRAPHY AND DATA SECURITY 238, 241 (Radu Sion ed., 2010) (“[L]egal uncertainty may drive 
users away from running [Tor] as an exit relay.”). 
146  See DINGLEDINE, supra note 71, at 5 (“[As compared to centralized-trust designs,] distributed-
trust designs . . . have a harder time tracking their users, and if they rely on volunteers to provide 
capacity, then getting more volunteers is a more complex process than just paying for more 
bandwidth.”); see also Cyrus Nemati, SXSW: Of Tech, Nerds, and New Media, CENTER FOR 
DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Mar. 15, 2010), http://www.cdt.org/blogs/cyrus-nemati/sxsw-tech-nerds-and-
new-media (“Tor is a fantastic anonymity network that is also fantastically slow, but the more people 
who use it, the faster it gets. This enables Internet users in free countries to do a little bit to help create 
an anonymous network for oppressed peoples.”). 
147  See Tor Network Status—Network Detail, TORSTATUS, http://torstatus.blutmagie.de/network_
detail.php (last visited July 2, 2012) (showing a total of 2832 nodes in the “Aggregate Summary—
Number of Routers Matching Specified Criteria”). The Tor Project reports similar statistics. See Tor 
Metrics Portal: Network, TOR PROJECT, https://metrics.torproject.org/network.html (last visited July 2, 
2012). These are rough estimates because, of the three classes of nodes comprising the Tor operator 
network, only two (relay nodes and exit nodes) are listed publicly. Abbott, supra note 10, at 23; see also 
TorDNSExitList, TOR PROJECT, https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/
TorDNSExitList (last visited July 2, 2012) (explaining how to determine if a particular IP address 
belongs to a Tor exit node). Publicly listed nodes are susceptible to blocking by governments or 
websites that seek to deter Tor usage. For this reason, the IP addresses of Tor “bridge” providers (the 
third type of node) are never made public. Abbott, supra note 10, at 22–23. 
148  Ngan et al., supra note 145. 
149  See Tor FAQ, supra note 72 (“If you have lots of bandwidth, you should definitely run a normal 
relay . . . . If you’re willing to be an exit, you should definitely run a normal relay, since we need more 
exits.”). 
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unsurprising fact, given that they face the greatest risk of liability. 
This specter of liability also chills speech. Fearing liability, ISPs and 
institutional service providers (including universities) increasingly censor 
their users—including Tor operators.150 And operators who receive DMCA 
§ 512(c) notices from their ISPs may, quite understandably, choose to cease 
the activity rather than risk losing Internet connectivity.151 
This Part argues that Tor operators, like ISPs, should be entitled to 
statutory safe harbor under DMCA § 512(a) as conduits for transitory 
network communications.152 Section 512 of the DMCA, also called the 
Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act (OCILLA), creates 
four separate safe harbor provisions.153 Parties falling within a safe harbor 
provision are exempt from monetary liability, but they may still face 
injunctive orders.154 
A. Tor Operators Are Eligible for § 512 Safe Harbor Protection 
Section 512(a) limits monetary liability for digital network 
communication service providers that merely act as conduits for 
information.155 “Service provider” is a term of art, defined within the statute 
to indicate “an entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of 
connections for digital online communications, between or among points 
specified by a user, of material of the user’s choosing, without modification 
to the content of the material as sent or received.”156 Tor fits this definition 
rather neatly—it passes a user’s Internet traffic through a circuit of Tor 
 
150  Researchers at the University of Colorado, Boulder, experienced this effect firsthand. To better 
understand Tor’s uses and misuses, they launched an exit node and collected usage data in the form of 
traffic logs. The researchers received numerous § 512(c) notices and were asked by university 
administration to discontinue the node. See McCoy et al., supra note 8, at 63–66, 71. 
151  The Tor Project recommends that exit node operators communicate proactively with their ISPs 
so that they “don’t end up being shut down due to easily preventable abuse complaints.” mikeperry, 
supra note 108. However, as one exit node operator’s comment illustrates, this is easier said than done: 
“I just had to shut down my exit node due to DMCA complaints for bittorrent traffic. My exit node 
received 7 DMCA complaints within two months. . . . The provider was very understanding, but were 
[sic] getting pressure from their upstream provider.” Anonymous, Tips for Running an Exit Node with 
Minimal Harassment, TOR BLOG (Sept. 17, 2010), https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tips-running-exit-
node-minimal-harassment. 
152  17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2006). 
153  See Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, Pub. L. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 
(codified at § 512). See generally NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 124, § 12B.01[C][1–2] (providing an 
overview of DMCA limitations on liability); id. § 12B.02 (discussing the first safe harbor provision, for 
transitory digital network communications). 
154  See id. § 12B.01[C][2] (“The distinctive feature of [OCILLA] is that it creates something that 
falls slightly short of being a complete exemption. Instead, it creates various ‘limitations on liability,’ 
which are tantamount to exemptions in all material respects but one: a party who qualifies may still be 
subject to injunction.” (footnotes omitted)). 
155  § 512(a). 
156  Id. § 512(k)(1)(A). 
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operators before routing it to the destination. As the Tor Project website 
explains, “Tor does not modify, or even know, what you are sending into it. 
It merely relays your traffic.”157 
To qualify for any of the four safe harbors in § 512, service providers 
must meet two threshold conditions for eligibility. They must (1) maintain a 
termination policy for repeat infringers158 and (2) comply with “standard 
technical measures.”159 
First, under § 512(i)(1)(A), service providers must adopt, reasonably 
implement, and inform their subscribers or account holders of their 
termination policies addressing repeat infringers.160 Tor arguably meets this 
condition through the use of “exit policies” that govern the specific types of 
connections (known as “ports”) that are permitted or denied by each 
operator.161 For example, Tor’s default exit policy attempts to prevent 
spamming and file sharing by blocking the ports typically associated with 
those activities.162 
Admittedly, exit policies do not constitute strict adherence to 
§ 512(i)(1)(A). Tor is not a subscription service, and its users—be they 
repeat infringers or law-abiding citizens—are quite intentionally 
unidentifiable. However, in the context of an anonymity network, an 
operator who adopts a reasonable exit policy designed to prevent file-
sharing traffic is complying with this provision to the fullest extent possible 
and should be deemed eligible for safe harbor protection. 
The second condition for safe harbor eligibility, § 512(i)(1)(B), 
requires service providers to “accommodate[] and . . . not interfere with 
standard technical measures.”163 Although the term “standard technical 
measures” is subsequently defined as “technical measures that are used by 
copyright owners to identify or protect copyrighted works,”164 it remains an 
 
157  Tor FAQ, supra note 72. This statement assumes that the Tor operator is using the software as 
intended. It is technically possible for operators to modify Tor’s software in such a way as to allow 
inspection of outgoing data. Tor operators are cautioned not to do this. See EFF, Legal FAQ, supra note 
72 (“Do not examine the contents of anyone’s communications without first talking to a lawyer.”). Tor 
users can protect themselves against malicious exit nodes by using encryption—“https” instead of 
“http.” See Surveillance Self-Defense, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://ssd.eff.org/tech/tor (last visited 
July 2, 2012). 
158  § 512(i)(1)(A). 
159  Id. § 512(i)(1)(B). 
160  Id. § 512(i)(1)(A). 
161  See Tor FAQ, supra note 72 (explaining that exit policies were implemented to minimize abuse). 
162  Id.; see also Abbott, supra note 10, at 26 (“Nearly every exit node disallows email traffic to 
prevent spam and blocks file-sharing traffic to prevent DMCA issues. . . . This ability to block 
access . . . gives exit node operators protection and thereby increases the number of willing operators.”). 
But see McCoy et al., supra note 150, at 67 (observing that port-based blocking strategies are easily 
circumvented). 
163  § 512(i)(1)(B). 
164  Id. § 512(i)(2). 
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elusive concept in practice.165 
Countersurveillance specialist Richard Abbott suggests that Tor 
operators may run afoul of the § 512(i)(1)(B) noninterference requirement 
because they enable Tor users to reach websites in spite of IP filtering—a 
method that allows websites to display content only to users within a given 
geographic location, while blocking the rest.166 IP filtering, also called “geo-
blocking,” allows websites to deliver copyrighted content in compliance 
with licensing agreements that restrict distribution rights to specific 
locations.167 Tor defeats IP filtering because it can, for example, enable 
U.S.-based users to access BBC broadcast materials intended for U.K. 
audiences by routing traffic through an exit node whose IP address is 
located in the United Kingdom.168 However, an interpretation of “standard 
technical measures” that encompasses IP filtering would be unworkably 
broad. As Abbott points out, it would sweep in other widely used (and 
legal) technologies, including virtual private networks (VPNs).169 
 
165  See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 124, at § 12B.02[B][3][a] (“Even as of many years after 
enactment of [OCILLA], it is unclear whether there is any such thing as ‘standard technical 
measures.’”). 
166  Abbott, supra note 10, at 25–26. 
167  See Michael Geist, Geo-Blocking Sites a Business Rather Than Legal Issue, MICHAEL GEIST 
(July 8, 2010), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/5179/135 (“[T]he geo-blocking approach is . . . 
an attempt to preserve an older business model, namely content licencing on a country-by-country or 
market-by-market approach . . . .”). Dr. Geist observed that geo-blocking is a worldwide phenomenon, 
affecting U.S. users (who, at that time, could not reach the U.K.-based music service Spotify) and 
Canadian users (who cannot reach the popular U.S.-based music service Pandora). Id. Spotify launched 
a service for the United States in July 2011. See, e.g., Don Reisinger, Spotify (Finally) Launches in the 
U.S., CNET NEWS (July 14, 2011, 5:10 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13506_3-20079400-17/spotify-
finally-launches-in-the-u.s. 
168  I borrow this example from Abbott, supra note 10, at 25 (“Tor allows anyone to access the 
BBC’s Web site via a UK exit node via a UK IP address.”). 
Tor’s IP filter-busting capabilities could, incidentally, also spell liability for Tor operators and 
distributors of Tor technology, even in the absence of actual infringement. Although this frightening 
prospect is beyond the scope of this Comment, a brief explanation is warranted. The operator’s liability 
might arise under DMCA § 1201(a)(1)(A), a provision that outlaws circumvention of copyright access 
protection measures. IP address filtering is arguably a “technological measure that effectively controls 
access” to a protected work and is circumvented by the Tor operator who masks the actual user’s IP 
address—conduct prohibited under § 1201(a)(1)(A). See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 
105-304, § 103, 112 Stat. 2860, 2863 (1998) (codified as 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006)). A related provision, 
§ 1201(a)(2), creates liability for manufacturers and traffickers of technology that circumvents such 
access-protection measures. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes teaches that “the anti-trafficking 
provision of the DMCA is implicated where one presents, holds out or makes a circumvention 
technology or device available, knowing its nature, for the purpose of allowing others to acquire it.” 
111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d sub nom. Universal Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 
429 (2d Cir. 2001). Any distributor of Tor software is arguably vulnerable to liability under this line of 
reasoning. At present, that distributor is U.S.-based nonprofit organization The Tor Project. 
169  Abbott, supra note 10, at 25. Using VPN technology, an employer can give its remote 
employees secure, encrypted access to data residing on the employer’s private network. See, e.g., Cisco 
VPN Client, CISCO, http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/sw/secursw/ps2308/index.html (last visited 
July 2, 2012). VPN technology is spreading beyond the corporate world as a way for users of unsecured 
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Tor operators are, therefore, “service providers” who meet § 512’s two 
general requirements. This threshold eligibility opens up four statutory safe 
harbors, of which only § 512(a) (the safe harbor for “Transitory Digital 
Network Communications,” also called the conduit safe harbor) is likely to 
be invoked by a Tor operator.170 It is to the operator’s eligibility under this 
subsection that I now turn. 
B. Tor Operators Should Enjoy § 512(a) Conduit Safe Harbor 
Under DMCA § 512(a), a service provider is not liable for 
infringement of copyright [that occurs] by reason of the provider’s 
transmitting, routing, or providing connections for, material through a system 
or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider, or by reason 
of the intermediate and transient storage of that material in the course of such 
transmitting, routing, or providing connections 
provided that five statutory requirements are met.171 Tor meets the five 
requirements as follows. 
First, under § 512(a)(1), the transmission must be “initiated by or at the 
direction of a person other than the service provider.”172 This is true of Tor 
operators in that they merely relay Internet traffic initiated by a Tor user.173 
Second, under § 512(a)(2), “the transmission, routing, provision of 
connections, or storage” must be “carried out through an automatic 
technical process without selection of the material by the service 
provider.”174 That is precisely what Tor software does: it automatically 
selects a random circuit of Tor operators through which it routes the Tor 
user’s activity.175 Operators do not select the routed material—the software 
does it for them. 
One could argue that the operator’s ability to set an exit policy176 
 
public Wi-Fi connections to protect themselves from a form of identity theft know as “session 
hijacking.” See, e.g., Jolie O’Dell, HOW TO: Protect Yourself from Firesheep with a VPN, MASHABLE 
TECH (Oct. 28, 2010), http://www.mashable.com/2010/10/28/firesheep-vpns (discussing VPN as a way 
to protect private information from hackers using the malicious session hijacking program Firesheep). 
170  17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006) also provides limited liability, under specified circumstances, to service 
providers that (1) store data only temporarily (the “System Caching” safe harbor under § 512(b)), (2) 
store user-generated data (the safe harbor for “Information Residing on Systems or Networks at 
Direction of Users” under § 512(c)), or (3) act as search engines (the safe harbor for “Information 
Location Tools” under § 512(d)). Tor operators perform none of these functions. 
171  Id. § 512(a). 
172  Id. § 512(a)(1). 
173  See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
174  § 512(a)(2). 
175  See Tor: Overview, supra note 11 (“Instead of taking a direct route from source to destination, 
data packets on the Tor network take a random pathway through several relays . . . . To create a private 
network pathway with Tor, the user’s software or client incrementally builds a circuit of encrypted 
connections through relays on the network.”). 
176  For a discussion of Tor operator exit policies, see supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text. 
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constitutes a selection of routed material, thereby disqualifying Tor 
operators from the conduit safe harbor for failure to meet § 512(a)(2). This 
is partly true. By turning off a specific port, an operator can ensure that the 
type of material typically transmitted through the blocked port will not be 
routed through that operator’s tunnel. However, rather than selecting (or 
more accurately, blocking) specific material, the exit node operator is 
making a wholesale decision to block all material—infringing or 
otherwise—that may be transmitted over a given port. This level of control 
is therefore much too attenuated to constitute a “selection” of material for 
§ 512(a)(2) purposes. 
Under the third statutory requirement, service providers must “not 
select the recipients of the material except as an automatic response to the 
request of another person.”177 This is true as to the ultimate recipient of 
material transmitted through a circuit of Tor operators because the 
destination is predetermined by the Tor user who initiated the request. 
Operators who route traffic along the circuit are not properly characterized 
as “recipients”;178 hence, it is irrelevant that the precise pathway (that is, the 
sequence of operators randomly selected by Tor software to form the 
circuit) is not actually selected by the user. 
Tor operators also meet the fourth statutory requirement: 
 [N]o copy of the material made by the service provider in the course of such 
intermediate or transient storage is maintained on the system or network in a 
manner ordinarily accessible to anyone other than anticipated recipients, and 
no such copy is maintained on the system or network in a manner ordinarily 
accessible to such anticipated recipients for a longer period than is reasonably 
necessary for the transmission, routing, or provision of connections.179 
Operators do not store the transmitted data—they merely hand it off 
from one node to another until reaching the exit node, which then passes the 
data to the user’s destination.180 Although it is technically possible for a 
malicious exit node operator to capture and store information at this final 
handoff,181 doing so would require modifying the Tor software itself.182 Such 
an individual is not so much a Tor operator as a garden-variety hacker. 
 
177  § 512(a)(3). 
178  See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
179  § 512(a)(4). 
180  The same process occurs in reverse when the destination responds to a Tor user’s request: data 
travels back through a random circuit of Tor operators before arriving at the user. See Tor: Overview, 
supra note 11. 
181  See McCoy et al., supra note 8, at 67–68 (explaining that an eavesdropping exit node can, in 
some situations, capture identifying information such as usernames and passwords). 
182  See EFF, Legal FAQ, supra note 72 (“You may be technically capable of modifying the Tor 
source code or installing additional software to monitor or log plaintext that exits your relay. However, 
Tor relay operators in the United States can possibly create civil and even criminal liability for 
themselves under state or federal wiretap laws if they monitor, log, or disclose Tor users’ 
communications . . . .”). 
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Tor operators meet the final requirement, transmission of material 
“through the system or network without modification of its content,”183 as a 
consequence of the same automatic process discussed in connection with 
§ 512(a)(3). Operators do not inspect content much less modify it. They 
merely route information along a randomly assigned circuit. 
C. Conduit Safe Harbor in the File-Sharing Context: Why Tor Operators 
Can Prevail Where Napster Failed184 
I anticipate that Tor litigation will arise in an illegal file-sharing 
context, most likely in connection with the popular BitTorrent file-sharing 
protocol. For example, the Hurt Locker litigation185 might lead to the 
identification of defendants’ IP addresses belonging to Tor exit node 
operators.186 In the absence of direct evidence, plaintiffs would likely be 
unable to prove direct infringement by a Tor operator because the 
operator’s passivity weighs heavily against finding the volitional element 
required for direct infringement.187 There is, however, a case to be made for 
contributory infringement liability.188 
Defendant file-sharing services have not fared well in secondary 
infringement actions,189 and it stands to reason that Tor operator–defendants 
 
183  § 512(a)(5). 
184  This Part uses Napster, rather than Grokster, as a comparator for reasons discussed supra text 
accompanying notes 130–33. 
185  See supra notes 113–15 and accompanying text. 
186  Rights holders who seek to identify direct infringers through the statutory subpoena process 
described in DMCA § 512(h) do, admittedly, face an uphill battle. This is because § 512(h) has been 
interpreted not to apply to online service providers that act merely as conduits for allegedly infringing 
information. See, e.g., Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 
1229, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“[T]he text of § 512(h) and the overall structure of § 512 clearly 
establish . . . that § 512(h) does not authorize the issuance of a subpoena to an ISP acting as a mere 
conduit for the transmission of information sent by others.”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 924 (2004); see also 
In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc. Subpoena Enforcement Matter, 393 F.3d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(agreeing with Verizon’s reasoning). 
187  See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1369–70 
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (“Although copyright is a strict liability statute, there should still be some element of 
volition or causation which is lacking where a defendant’s system is merely used to create a copy by a 
third party.”). 
188  An interesting question arises as to whether plaintiffs would seek to subpoena the Tor operator 
in an attempt to reveal the direct infringer’s identity. By its nature, Tor ensures that operators will have 
“no incriminating information to turn over.” Abbott, supra note 10 (noting further that operators cannot 
“effectively police the activity of users”). Although the last link in the chain—the exit node—can 
potentially eavesdrop on the information that passes between it and the destination, it has no way of 
identifying the original user who initiated the communication. Id. at 23–24; see also supra note 157 
(discussing exit node abuse). 
189  See, e.g., A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2000) 
(granting plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th 
Cir. 2001); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. C 99-05183 MHP, 2000 WL 573136, at *10 (N.D. 
Cal. May 12, 2000) (denying defendant Napster’s motion for summary judgment and finding that 
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would face many of the same arguments against safe harbor that helped 
plaintiffs defeat the likes of Napster. But Tor is not a file-sharing service, 
and decentralized, volunteer-run anonymity networks like Tor can satisfy 
conduit safe harbor requirements where file-sharing services have failed. 
Admittedly, the Tor network does resemble a file-sharing network,190 
and the emergence of Tor–BitTorrent hybrid programs such as Vuze191 blurs 
the distinction even further. File-sharing pioneer Napster tried the § 512(a) 
defense and failed so miserably that its de facto successor, Grokster, did not 
even bother invoking a conduit safe harbor defense when it stood accused 
of contributory infringement.192 Napster’s play for conduit safe harbor failed 
because it did not “transmit, route, or provide connections for allegedly 
infringing material through its system.”193  Noting the intentions of 
Congress to limit § 512(a) to situations “in which a service provider plays 
the role of a ‘conduit’ for the communications of others,”194 the district 
court found that Napster’s role in conveying “address information to 
establish a connection between the requesting and host[ing] users” did not 
constitute a connection provided “through” its system.195 Rather than 
traveling through the Napster system, the connection was found to occur 
“through the Internet.”196 
Tor is easily distinguishable from Napster. Whereas Napster’s 
infringing transmissions never traveled through Napster servers—passing 
instead from host to recipient “through the Internet”197—an infringing 
transmission would travel directly through a Tor operator’s computer. The 
fact that traffic emerges at the destination bearing the exit node’s IP address 
is proof that it has traveled “through” that operator. Thus, Tor operator–
defendants should qualify for safe harbor under § 512(a). 
Unfortunately, even if Tor operator–defendants qualify for safe harbor 
protection from monetary remedies under § 512(a) for the reasons described 
 
Napster “does not meet the requirements of subsection 512(a)”). 
190  See Paul Ohm, Good Enough Privacy, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 44. 
191  The popular BitTorrent client Vuze (formerly called Azureus) has built-in Tor support. Vuze 
does, however, discourage using Tor to anonymize file-sharing traffic. See Anonymous File Sharing 
Using Azureus with Tor and I2P, VUZEWIKI, http://wiki.vuze.com/w/Anonymous_file_sharing_using_
Azureus_with_Tor_and_I2P (last updated Mar. 3, 2010, 7:35 PM) (“Please DO NOT use Tor for routing 
peer-to-peer data traffic, it can not handle the bandwidth. They have indicated that they will make efforts 
to ban such usage if it continues, which will likely affect both legitimate and unwanted use!” (emphasis 
omitted)). These statements, however self-serving when delivered by Vuze, are echoed by Tor. See, e.g., 
sources cited supra note 72. 
192  See supra notes 129–33 and accompanying text (discussing litigation against Grokster). 
193  A & M Records, 2000 WL 573136, at *10 (emphasis added). 
194  Id. at *8 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2 (1998)).  
195  Id. 
196  Id. Although neither party had attempted to define “routing” for the purposes of § 512(a), the 
court found that routing also did not occur through Napster’s system. Id. 
197  Id. at *7–8. 
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in this Part, they may yet face injunctive action under § 512(j)(1)(B). Courts 
considering such injunctive relief must weigh a number of statutorily 
delineated factors including the burden placed upon a service provider, the 
magnitude of likely harm to the rights holder, technical feasibility and 
effectiveness of injunctive relief, and the availability of less burdensome 
solutions.198 Part IV argues that injunctive action against a Tor operator 
impinges on the operator’s First Amendment speech interest—a serious 
burden that militates against the granting of injunctive relief. 
IV. BALANCING HARMS: TOR AND FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS 
“[I]n cyberspace, the First Amendment is a local ordinance.” 
–John Perry Barlow199 
 
The Tor operator is an individual who enables others to bypass 
censorship and speak anonymously, and any limitation on the operator’s 
ability to perform these functions raises First Amendment issues. By 
allowing speakers—Tor users—to convey information anonymously and 
without fear of reprisal, Tor operators are furthering a First Amendment 
right to receive information.200 Further, the act of facilitating someone else’s 
speech arguably constitutes “speech” for First Amendment purposes, and is 
worthy of protection in and of itself.201 Courts in equity should weigh the 
burden upon these twin interests when considering injunctive relief against 
a Tor operator.202 
A. Tor and the Right to Receive Information 
The First Amendment undoubtedly protects an individual’s right to 
receive information.203 This right operates in tandem with the press freedom 
 
198  17 U.S.C. § 512(j)(2)(A)–(D) (2006). 
199  LESSIG, supra note 88, at 383 n.4 (quoting John Perry Barlow). 
200  See infra notes 203–04 and accompanying text. 
201  For example, in the context of campaign finance, restrictions on speech-facilitating monetary 
contributions implicate the First Amendment. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per 
curiam) (“A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication 
during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues 
discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.”). 
202  As discussed supra Part III, § 512(a) shields transitory digital network providers from monetary 
liability only—it leaves open the possibility of injunctive or equitable relief. In the file-sharing context, 
plaintiffs have often sought injunctive relief to stop alleged infringement. See, e.g., Arista Records LLC 
v. Lime Wire LLC, No. 06 Civ. 05936 (KMW), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115675, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 
26, 2010) (permanently enjoining the LimeWire file-sharing service). 
203  Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“It is now well established that the Constitution 
protects the right to receive information and ideas. ‘This freedom [of speech and press] . . . necessarily 
protects the right to receive . . . .’” (alteration and omissions in original) (quoting Martin v. City of 
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943))). 
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as a necessary consequence of the right to distribute information.204 
Today’s press, the primary distributor of information, is a much-
democratized version of its former self thanks to the phenomenon of citizen 
journalism.205 Beyond our borders, oppressive regimes can no longer rely on 
state-run media to deliver a preapproved monologue, as citizen journalists 
have turned media into dialogue.206 We Americans, in turn, are no longer 
required to judge the adequacy of our elected representatives’ foreign policy 
decisions based solely on reports obtained through mainstream media. 
Admittedly, the democratization of journalism has its flaws: amateur 
journalists can be unreliable sources of information207 and professional 
journalists might feel the need to abandon or abridge their journalistic 
standards to compete with the amateurs in terms of sheer speed of news 
dissemination.208 Nevertheless, as a phenomenon that can lend individuals 
access to otherwise-unobtainable news, citizen journalism is a good thing. 
That an informed citizenry is essential to the proper functioning of our own 
democracy is “at once a cornerstone of serious legal and moral philosophy, 
a high school civics verity, and a cliché.”209 
Like the Iranian example of 2009, subsequent democratic movements 
in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and much of the Arab world—a phenomenon 
termed the “Arab Spring”210—illustrate that people’s ability to receive 
 
204  See Martin, 319 U.S. at 143 (“The right of freedom of speech and press has broad scope. The 
authors of the First Amendment knew that novel and unconventional ideas might disturb the 
complacent, but they chose to encourage a freedom which they believed essential if vigorous 
enlightenment was ever to triumph over slothful ignorance. This freedom embraces the right to 
distribute literature . . . and necessarily protects the right to receive it.” (footnote omitted)). 
205  See A. Michael Froomkin, Technologies for Democracy, in DEMOCRACY ONLINE, supra note 
105, at 3, 9 (“Blogs represent one of the latest examples of the Internet’s democratization of 
publishing.”). 
206  See, e.g., Kendra Heideman & Haleh Esfandiari, You Are the Media: How Iranians 
“Democratized” the Media, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, http://www.wilsoncenter.
org/event/you-are-the-media-how-iranians-democratized-the-media (last visited July 2, 2012) (“[T]he 
rise of citizen journalism in Iran after the 2009 election symbolized a reversal of information 
dissemination, an effective ‘democratization’ of media. . . . [J]ournalist Roozbeh 
Mirebrahimi . . . commented that this transformation crushed the traditional ‘monologue’ and instead 
created a new ‘dialogue’ in Iran.”). 
207  See ANDREW KEEN, THE CULT OF THE AMATEUR: HOW TODAY’S INTERNET IS KILLING OUR 
CULTURE 5 (2007) (“It’s the blind leading the blind—infinite monkeys providing infinite information for 
infinite readers, perpetuating the cycle of misinformation and ignorance.”). 
208  See Larry E. Ribstein, From Bricks to Pajamas: The Law and Economics of Amateur 
Journalism, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 185, 209 (2006) (“When ‘pajama bloggers’ who need not answer 
to an editor can rush stories onto millions of computer screens, professionals might abandon their 
standards in order to compete.”). 
209  Froomkin, supra note 205, at 3. 
210  See Con Coughlin, From Arab Spring to Boiling-Hot Summer: Iran Is Ruthlessly Exploiting the 
Pro-Democracy Movement for Its Own Ends, TELEGRAPH (May 10, 2011, 8:05 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/concoughlin/8505793/From-Arab-Spring-to-boiling-
hot-summer.html (explaining that the term “Arab Spring” was “meant to encapsulate the youthful 
exuberance of the pro-democracy movements that had sprung up throughout the Middle East” in early 
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accurate, timely information about world events is well-served by the 
courageous work of citizen journalists abroad.211 Tor technology promotes 
the exercise of the right to receive information.212 This technology offers a 
nontraceability213 that is essential to protect speakers who live under 
political repression—so essential that Lawrence Lessig has advocated for 
recognition of a protected legal right to “privacy-enhancing 
technologies.”214 Protecting online privacy is a laudable goal unto itself,215 
and a speaker’s right to the same anonymity enjoyed by Publius of the 
Federalist Papers is hardly in dispute.216 However, the Tor operator’s role 
takes on constitutional dimensions when we recognize that protecting 
speaker anonymity promotes a First Amendment right to receive 
information. 
B. Speech-Facilitation as Protected Speech 
People volunteer to become Tor operators because they believe in 
protecting civil liberties on the Internet. They donate things of measurable 
pecuniary value: bandwidth, computer resources, and time. They do these 
things to send a political statement about freedom in a digital age. Their 
conduct, like the burning of a flag or a draft card, speaks volumes and 
should be protected as speech. 
During the same year that saw the invention of the World Wide Web,217 
 
2011). 
211  Even old-guard media establishments like the New York Times have incorporated citizen 
journalism into their reporting on the Middle Eastern protest movements. See, e.g., Arab World 
Uprisings: A Country-by-Country Look, N.Y. TIMES (last updated Dec. 10, 2011), http://www.nytimes.
com/interactive/world/middleeast/middle-east-hub.html?ref=middleeast (combining uncensored and 
often untranslated Twitter postings with Times correspondent reports on Libya, Yemen, Syria, and 
Egypt). 
212  Writing on the issue of U.S. trade sanctions against Iran, Nadia Luhr argues that the sanctions 
regime prior to March 2010 operated as a prior restraint on speech because it caused Americans to be 
deprived of Iran-related news. Nadia L. Luhr, Note, Iran, Social Media, and U.S. Trade Sanctions: The 
First Amendment Implications of U.S. Foreign Policy, 8 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 500, 520 (2010); id. at 
501 (“Prohibiting American Web 2.0 companies from providing access to users in sanctioned countries 
restricted Americans’ ability to receive communications from these users, and such a prohibition 
constituted unconstitutional prior restraint.”). 
213  Internet anonymity—or, more specifically, nontraceability—is the ability “to send a message 
without the content of that message being traced to the sender.” LESSIG, supra note 88, at 224–25. 
214  Id. Lessig defines “privacy-enhancing technologies” as those “technologies designed to give the 
user more technical control over data associated with him or her.” Id. at 223. 
215  It is also a goal shared by the Obama administration. See Julia Angwin, Watchdog Planned for 
Online Privacy, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2010, at A1 (“The Obama Administration is preparing a stepped-
up approach to policing Internet privacy that calls for new laws and the creation of a new position to 
oversee the effort . . . .”). 
216  See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995) (“[A]n author’s decision to 
remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of a 
publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.”). 
217  The year was 1989, and the inventor’s name was Tim Berners-Lee (not Al Gore). See Tim 
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the U.S. Supreme Court famously determined that defendant Gregory Lee 
Johnson’s conduct—burning the American flag—was a form of political 
expression protected by the First Amendment.218 Johnson teaches that 
“conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the First 
Amendment into play” when it evinces an “intent to convey a particularized 
message” and when that message is likely to be understood by its 
audience.219 
By the Johnson definition, a Tor operator’s conduct contains enough 
elements of speech to implicate the First Amendment. Tor’s purpose is 
articulated ad nauseam on numerous web pages hosted by the Tor Project, 
the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), and even the U.S. Naval 
Research Laboratory.220 Tor exit node operators are also advised to post web 
pages called “exit notices” so that curious ISPs can easily understand their 
raisons d’être.221 The message is intentional, particularized, and conveyed 
in the customary manner of the Internet—a web page. 
Critics will be quick to point out that a weighing of First Amendment 
interests is unnecessary because “copyright law contains built-in First 
Amendment accommodations.”222 However, as the Supreme Court observed 
in Eldred v. Ashcroft, copyright laws are not “categorically immune” from 
First Amendment challenges.223 It stands to reason that relief granted in 
vindication of a copyright violation is similarly not immune from 
countervailing First Amendment considerations. A court considering 
injunctive relief against a Tor operator is free to, and in fact must, balance 
interests and harms in furtherance of equity. 
We should apply laws to cyberspace in speech-protective ways because 
in doing so we allow a democratizing medium to flourish elsewhere in the 
 
Berners-Lee, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM, http://www.w3.org/People/Berners-Lee/Overview.html 
(last visited July 2, 2012). 
218  Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989). 
219  Id. at 404 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974)). 
220  See, e.g., Esguerra, supra note 92 (EFF); Executive Summary, ONION ROUTING, http://www.
onion-router.net/Summary.html (last visited July 2, 2012) (U.S. Naval Research Laboratory). 
221  See mikeperry, supra note 108 (“Once you have a good reverse DNS name, you should put some 
content there that explains what Tor is for those who see the name and try to visit it via http.”). For a 
sample Exit Notice, see This Is a Tor Exit Router, TOR PROJECT, http://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git?a=
blob_plain;hb=HEAD;f=contrib/tor-exit-notice.html (last visited July 2, 2012) (“This router is part of 
the Tor Anonymity Network, which is dedicated to providing privacy to people who need it most: 
average computer users.”). 
222  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 193, 219–21 (2003) (holding that the Copyright Term 
Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102(b), (d), 112 Stat. 2827–28 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C. §§ 302, 304 (2006)), which increases the duration of copyright protection of new and existing 
works from fifty years to seventy years following the author’s death, did not violate the First 
Amendment). 
223  Id. at 221 (“We recognize that the D.C. Circuit spoke too broadly when it declared copyrights 
‘categorically immune from challenges under the First Amendment.’” (quoting Elrod v. Reno, 239 F.3d 
372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001))). 
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world.224 As Jack Balkin has observed, the Internet is home to discussions, 
debates, and collective activities whose value transcends national borders.225 
And where people desire democracy but have little familiarity with its 
customs, the Internet becomes a pedagogical tool conveying democratic 
culture—“a culture in which ordinary people can participate, both 
collectively and individually, in the creation and elaboration of cultural 
meanings that constitute them as individuals.”226 
Balkin argues that we should protect this digital democratic culture 
because of its innate value to mankind, and regardless of its impact on 
American politics or foreign policy.227 But one need not go quite that far to 
protect a Tor operator’s speech—that speech immediately invokes a 
political discussion of American civil liberties on the Internet and carries 
implications for U.S. foreign policy. The proof is in the blogosphere. 
Despite the best efforts of an unpopular and often lawless Iranian 
government, democratic culture is emerging in the digital Iran. The Iranian 
blogosphere, an online community inhabited by over 60,000 routinely 
updated weblogs, is “full of advocates, on all sides. . . . featur[ing] 
thousands of politically attentive individuals, commenting on every 
imaginable issue, with a breadth of perspectives.”228 Iranian citizen 
journalism is arguably on its way to replacing state-run media as a primary 
source of news.229 
By enabling an Iranian blogger to speak without fear of imprisonment 
and providing an Iranian reader with the opportunity to become an educated 
global citizen unconstrained by censorship, we promote free expression, 
tolerance, and a sense of shared responsibility—cultural elements that are as 
 
224  This is rooted in the ideas of Jack Balkin, who writes, “The Internet teaches us that the free 
speech principle is about, and has always been about, the promotion and development of a democratic 
culture.” Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression 
for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 34 (2004). 
225  Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 427, 438 
(2009) (“[W]hat people do on the Internet transcends the nation state; they participate in discussions, 
debate, and collective activity that does not respect national borders.”). 
226  Id. (citing Balkin, supra note 224, at 3–6, 33–50). 
227  Id. at 438–39 (“These are valuable human activities in their own right; they should not be 
protected only because and to the degree that they might contribute to debate about American politics, or 
even American foreign policy.” (citing Balkin, supra note 224, at 32)). 
228  John Kelly & Bruce Etling, Mapping Iran’s Online Public: Politics and Culture in the Persian 
Blogosphere 10–11 (Berkman Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y, Berkman Ctr. Research Publ’n No. 2008-01, 
2008), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/Kelly&Etling_
Mapping_Irans_Online_Public_2008.pdf. I am unable to determine the extent to which these bloggers 
make use of anonymity technology. 
229  See Doug Bernard, Blogs as Journalism in Iran, VOICE OF AM. (Apr. 12, 2010, 8:00 PM), 
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/science-technology/Blogs-as-Journalism-in-Iran-90741249.html 
(noting that, in Iran, “news stories often first appear on blogs, where writers are freer to cover events 
outside the sanction of government censors”). Indeed, Iranian political cartoonist Nikahang Kowsar says 
that what the U.S. considers citizen journalism is “just journalism” in Iran. Id. 
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vital to a democracy as the right to vote.230 Balkin argues that democracy in 
its broadest sense goes beyond an individual’s relationship to the state and 
extends instead to culture as a whole.231 If we are truly committed to 
nurturing democracy in places like Iran, we must recognize the role played 
by online speakers in allowing individuals to mold a new culture from clay 
of the old. 
CONCLUSION 
Tor operators, by their very existence, trigger a political dialogue about 
the importance of online civil liberties, and their services facilitate the 
development of democratic culture in places like Iran. They demonstrate 
that Tor has undeniable noninfringing uses that merit protection, and its 
volunteer operators should thus enjoy full First Amendment protection. At a 
minimum, they should benefit from § 512(a) safe harbor as conduits of 
digital communication. 
Without a doubt, anonymity comes at a price and anonymity 
technology may frustrate the efforts of creative artists who struggle to 
enforce their copyrights. But set on a scale, our interests in cherishing the 
right to receive information, protecting politically expressive conduct 
online, and nurturing nascent democratic cultures by allowing the Internet 
to flow freely in places like Iran outweighs the risk that Tor-like anonymity 
networks will facilitate infringement. 
 
 
230  Kelly & Etling, supra note 228, at 21, 22 (“Democracy requires voting booths, yes, but it also 
needs a culture of robust free expression with a tolerance for disagreement and dissent, undergirded by a 
general acceptance of certain moral fundamentals, including principles of fairness and equality, and a 
sense of shared citizenship and responsibility.”). 
231  Balkin, supra note 224, at 39 (“Power to the people—democracy—in its broadest, thickest 
sense, must include our relationship not simply to the state but to culture as a whole, to the processes of 
meaning-making that constitute us as individuals. Those processes of meaning-making include both the 
ability to distribute those meanings and the ability to receive them.”). 
